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GIVING BITE TO THE EU-U.S. DATA PRIVACY SAFE HARBOR:
MODEL SOLUTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT*
Daniel R. Leathers†
In 1998, the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) set 
out on an ambitious project to develop a program by which U.S.-based 
companies could conform to the strict EU data privacy directive when 
transferring EU citizens’ data. In effect, the program sought to reconcile 
EU and U.S. privacy laws when a U.S.-based company used or transferred 
EU citizens’ data. After two years of negotiations, the U.S. and the EU fina-
lized a program now commonly known as the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor. 
Yet, since the Safe Harbor’s inception, the program has been sub-
ject to heavy criticism from privacy advocates and an EU oversight commit-
tee. The heaviest criticism is levied against the Safe Harbor’s inadequate 
internal and external enforcement mechanisms.  
This Note proposes several improvements and modifications to the 
Safe Harbor’s enforcement mechanisms, while acknowledging and address-
ing various U.S. law impediments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy no longer can mean anonymity . . . it should mean that govern-
ment and businesses properly safeguards people’s private communications 
and financial information. 
—Donald Kerr, Principal Deputy Director of U.S. National Intelligence1
Everyday millions people in the European Union access websites 
owned and operated in the United States.2 They upload personal photos, log 
into bank accounts, make payments with credit cards, and input search in-
quiries. Massive amounts of data leave the control of consumers, and, more 
importantly, the jurisdictional reach of the European Union. 
In 1998, the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.) set 
out on an ambitious project to develop a program by which U.S.-based mul-
tinational companies and data processors (Companies) could conform to the 
strict EU data privacy directive (Data Directive) when transferring EU 
member-state citizens’ (EU Citizens) data.3 In effect, the program sought to 
reconcile EU and U.S. privacy laws when a Company used EU Citizens’ 
data within the U.S. or transferred EU Citizens’ data to or from the U.S. 
1 Pamela Hess, Intel Official: Expect Less Privacy, Huffington Post, Nov. 11, 2007, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20071111/terrorist-surveillance/. 
2 The twenty-seven European Union countries have almost 300 million internet users, a 
number that is growing every month. European Union Internet Usage Stats and Population 
Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats9.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2008). 
3 Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European parliament and of the Council on the pro-
tection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free move-
ment of such data, OJ No. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Directive]. 
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After two years of negotiations,4 the U.S.5 and the EU6 finalized the pro-
gram and in the Safe Harbor Agreement (Safe Harbor) in late July 2000. 
Yet, since the Safe Harbor’s inception, the program has been sub-
ject to heavy criticism from privacy advocates7 and an EU oversight com-
mittee.8 The heaviest criticism is levied against the Safe Harbor’s inade-
quate internal and external enforcement mechanisms. The Safe Harbor de-
signates the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as the primary external en-
forcement arm of the program, but as of 2004, the FTC had not prosecuted a 
single Company for violating the Safe Harbor’s protection of EU Citizens’ 
privacy rights.9
The lack of enforcement has left citizens of EU member states, who 
ordinarily rely on enforcement by national privacy agencies,10 to become 
their own police agents and report Safe Harbor violations on their own.11
For example, a data breach at a Company could lead to thousands of stolen 
identities. Within the United States, data breach notification laws vary wide-
ly;12 and worse, under the Safe Harbor, a Company has no requirement to 
4 Many documents were sent back and forth between the EU and the U.S. during the 
negotiations. See Documents adopted by the Data Protection Working Party 1999, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/workinggroup/wpdocs/1999_en.htm. 
5 The U.S. Department of Commerce published the final version of the agreement in the 
Federal Register on July 24, 2000. Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 
24, 2000). For consistency, this Note cites the European Union publication of the safe harbor 
agreement rather than the U.S. version. 
6 The European Union adopted the same wording as the U.S. Federal Register, on July 
26, 2000. Commission Decision 2000/520/EC Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe 
Harbor Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri 
Serv/site/en/oj/2000/l_215/l_21520000825en00070047.pdf [hereinafter Safe Harbor]. 
7 See infra Part V. 
8 See Commission Staff Working Document, The Implementation of Commission Deci-
sion 520/2000/EC on the Adequate Protection of Personal Data Provided by the Safe Harbor 
Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US Department of 
Commerce SEC (2004) 1323, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/do 
cs/adequacy/sec-2004-1323_en.pdf [hereinafter EU Safe Harbor Criticism]. 
9 Alan Pedersen, US Safe Harbor under fire, PRIVACY LAWS AND BUS. INT’L NEWSL.,
Oct.-Nov. 2004, at 1, 3, available at http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details%5CFile
Upload265%5C912%5CSafe_Harbor_Sotto_11.04.pdf.
10 See infra Part III.C.i. 
11 See infra Part V. 
12 Currently thirty-eight states have data-breach notifications laws, but only a handful of 
those states provide a private right-of-action. See Scott Berinato, Data Breach Notification 
Laws, State By State, CSO Disclosure Series, Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.csoonline.com/read/ 
020108/ammap/ammap.html. See also Posting of Tanya Forsheit to Privacy Law Blog, 
Breach Law Data, http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2007/08/articles/security-breach-
notification-l/breach-law-data/ (Aug. 3, 2007). 
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notify affected EU Citizens. An EU Citizens’ data could be lost or sold and 
the end effects would be obvious to the EU Citizen, but it would be imposs-
ible to pinpoint the Company that was the source of the data breach. With-
out knowing which Company was victimized, an EU Citizen would be pre-
vented from utilizing any of the Safe Harbor’s enforcement protections.13
Various U.S. failures to protect privacy, such as the Google-Double 
Click merger case study addressed in Part IV, have led to a deterioration of 
trust between EU and U.S. enforcement agencies.14 The EU views the U.S. 
and Companies as failing to adhere to the intent of the Safe Harbor.15 Nev-
ertheless, it should be of little surprise to EU regulators that Companies and 
U.S. agencies do not take the Safe Harbor seriously. The Safe Harbor, 
which is self-regulatory in nature, fails to obligate enforcement and estab-
lishes oversight in U.S. agencies that are unaccountable to the citizens 
whose data flows they are supposed to protect. Together, the Safe Harbor’s 
internal enforcement mechanisms and U.S. agency enforcement—through 
the FTC—fail to provide the guarantee of a complete investigation, which is 
what EU laws secure. In summation, the Safe Harbor is a poor attempt to 
reconcile the differences between U.S. and EU privacy regulatory efforts. 
This Note proposes several improvements and modifications to the 
Safe Harbor. These adjustments will better reconcile EU and U.S. privacy 
laws through effective Safe Harbor enforcement mechanisms, while ac-
knowledging and addressing various U.S. law impediments. Therefore, this 
Note engages in a statutory analysis that seeks to strengthen the current law 
for the benefit of U.S. and EU citizens alike; however, this Note does not 
address the far-reaching implications of a “right to privacy.”16 Part II ana-
lyzes the differing approaches to privacy regulation between the U.S. and 
the EU and suggests that these differences are roadblocks to effective priva-
cy regulation cooperation. Part III explains the details of the Safe Harbor 
program and its enforcement mechanisms. Part IV compares the level of 
regulatory scrutiny the U.S. and the EU applied to the Google-Double Click 
merger and suggests the differing approaches are evidence of the EU’s dete-
riorating trust in the U.S. privacy self-regulatory scheme. Part V outlines 
criticisms of the Safe Harbor’s limited enforcement mechanisms, recom-
mends several solutions, and responds to potential criticisms. 
13 See infra Part V.B.4.a (elaborating the data breach example). See also infra Part V.C.2.a 
(completing the analysis of the data breach example).  
14 See infra Part IV. 
15 See EU Safe Harbor Criticism, supra note 8, at 13–14. 
16 Scattered throughout this Note are several examples of ends-based implications of a 
right to privacy. For example, Part IV addresses some of the real-world consequences of the 
Google-DoubleClick merger. See infra Part IV. This Note also discusses the events of data 
breaches. See infra Part V.B.4.a. See also Part V.C.2.a. 
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II.  DIFFERING APPROACHES TO PRIVACY REGULATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
U.S. regulation of governmental collection and use of personal data 
are confined to the limited categories enumerated in federal statutes.17 U.S. 
regulation of private data collection is often called “sectoral” because only a 
few federal statutes regulate specific industries in limited circumstances.18
This leaves vast, unregulated gaps in the protection of data collected by 
private parties in the U.S.19 What Joel Reidenberg observed in 1995, re-
mains true today: 
Despite the growth of the Information Society, the United States has re-
sisted all calls for omnibus or comprehensive legal rules for fair informa-
tion practice in the private sector. Legal rules have developed on an ad 
hoc, targeted basis, while industry has elaborated voluntary norms and 
practices for particular problems. Over the years, there has been an almost 
zealous adherence to this ideal of narrowly targeted standards.20
The U.S. “sectoral” approach to privacy regulation, therefore, views statutes 
as a means to the end of privacy protection. For example, U.S. privacy leg-
islation protecting medical and banking records is a means towards the end 
purpose of preventing possible abuse of the information. 
In contrast, in the EU, regulation of the use, transfer, and processing 
of private data about identifiable persons is covered in sweeping “omnibus” 
data statutes.21 EU member states officially recognized the danger of private 
data collection as early as 1981.22 More recently, in 1995, the EU enacted 
the Data Directive,23 which regulates the exchange and transfer of any pri-
vate data, including handwritten and oral communications.24 In contrast to 
the U.S. “sectoral” approach to privacy, the EU “omnibus” approach to pri-
vacy regulation views privacy as an ends with respect to its inherent nature; 
17 See 5 U.S.C. § 552A (1974). 
18 Two examples are the medical and credit industries. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681; 12 U.S.C. §§ 
3401–3422 (1978). 
19 CHRISTOPHER WOLF, PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA 
SECURITY LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE 14-3 (Christopher Wolf ed., Practicing Law Insti-
tute 2007). 
20 Joel Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private 
Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 500 (1995) (internal citations omitted). 
21 WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-6. 
22 See Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108 (giving individuals the 
right to ensure their person data is being used lawfully by private parties). 
23 Data Directive, supra note 3. 
24 WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-6. 
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the EU views privacy as a protected state-of-being that is representative of 
individual autonomy.25
In the U.S., the vast majority of privacy regulation is enforced 
through private civil suits.26 These suits must be initiated, researched, and 
litigated all at the expense of the plaintiff. Under the Data Directive, how-
ever, member state data protection authorities (Data Protection Authorities) 
have direct power to inspect private data processors and begin administra-
tive proceedings against potential violators, which may result in fines or 
injunctions.27 Therefore, under the Data Directive, individuals whose priva-
cy may have been violated are not forced to bear a heavy monetary burden 
in order to pursue their cases. The Safe Harbor sought to reconcile these 
differences. 
III. GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM: EU-U.S. DATA PRIVACY SAFE HARBOR
PROGRAM
A. EU Data Transfers to Non-EU Nations  
The Data Directive specifically prohibits sending personal data to 
any country without a “level of data protection” considered “adequate” by 
EU standards.28 The determination of adequacy of foreign data protection 
involves the weighing of several non-exclusive factors, including the nature 
of that data, the purpose for processing, the duration of processing, the des-
tination country’s laws on data privacy, and the security measures in place 
at the destination country.29 Based on these factors, the EU has designated 
only three major non-EU countries’ protections as adequate.30 The EU has 
never viewed U.S. privacy law as “adequate” to protect privacy rights be-
cause of its piecemeal privacy regulations.31 Initially, EU officials had 
hoped to convince U.S. lawmakers to adopt a broad privacy regime similar 
25 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 130 (2007) (“The disclosure of 
personal information can severely inhibit a person’s autonomy and self-development.”). See 
also, Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999). 
26 See Francesca Bignami, European versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy 
Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 684 (2007). 
27 See id. at 648. 
28 Data Directive, supra note 3, art. 25(1). 
29 Id. art. 25(2). 
30 The three countries are those of Argentina, Canada, and Switzerland. See European 
Commission, Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in 
Third Countries, http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/thirdcountries/index_e 
n.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
31 See James A. Harvey, Struggle Continues with EU Personal Data Protection Directive,
EUROWATCH, Jan 15, 1999. 
2009] EU-U.S. DATA PRIVACY SAFE HARBOR 199
to the Data Directive,32 but this effort failed due to fundamentally differing 
conceptions of liberty.33 Since the U.S. was unwilling to pass comprehen-
sive data protection legislation that the EU would view as “adequate,”34
Companies were conflicted. When Companies transferred data to EU mem-
ber states, they were in violation of the Data Directive. Companies could 
not affect the EU opinion of U.S. privacy law adequacy, nor could Compa-
nies realistically lobby the U.S. government to implement a broad privacy 
regime similar to the Data Directive. Companies instead ignored the Data 
Directive and continued to transfer data to EU member states.35 Fortunately 
for the Companies, the EU informally suspended Data Directive enforce-
ment against Companies in 1998 and 1999.36
As a solution, the EU allows each Company to serve, in effect, as 
its own country with respect to the Data Directive, by committing itself to 
one of three options. The first option requires a Company to bind itself to 
one of three37 pre-approved contracts that limit data transfers.38 The con-
tracts essentially require the Company to act as if it were under the control 
of the Data Directive. The second option allows a Company to adopt bind-
ing corporate rules (Binding Corporate Rules).39
Both of the first two methods leave much to be desired. The model 
contracts are too simplistic for Companies to use in complicated interna-
tional transfers.40 The Binding Corporate Rules require a large investment41
and are unlikely to be used because they require Companies to open up their 
32 See id.
33 See generally, Bignami, supra note 26. 
34 See Harvey, supra note 31, at 8–9. 
35 See id. 
36 See id.
37 The EU Commissioner approved three types of contracts in three separate decisions. 
Commission Decision 2001/497/EC on Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of 
Personal Data to Third Countries, 2001 O.J. (L 181) 19 (regulating controller to controller 
data transfers); Commission Decision 2002/16/EC on Standard Contractual Clauses for the 
Transfer of Personal Data to Processor Established in Third Countries, 2002 O.J. (L 6) 52 
(regulating controller to processor data transfers); Commission Decision 2004/915/EC 
Amending Decision 2001/497/EC as Regards the Introduction of an Alternative Set of Stan-
dard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, 2004 O.J. (L 
385) 74 (creating a second contract option for controller to controller data transfers). 
38 This option is directly approved by the Data Directive. See Data Directive, supra note 3, 
art. 26(4). 
39 This option was created by the Data Protection Working Party, which is an advisory 
body that was created by article 29 of the Data Directive. See Data Directive, supra note 3, 
art. 29. 
40 See WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-32. 
41 See id.
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internal files to routine inspections by EU member states’ Data Protection 
Authorities.42
The third option, which is the subject of this Note, is the Safe Har-
bor. In 1998, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) and the European 
Commission began discussing the creation of a program for Companies to 
bind themselves to the Data Directive’s requirements.43 After two years of 
negotiations, the DOC and the EU eventually came to an agreement and 
created the Safe Harbor. The DOC promulgated a rule44 on July 24, 2000 
adopting the Safe Harbor into U.S. law.45 The compromise was ratified by 
the EU on July 26, 2000 in a special “decision” that did not require individ-
ual EU member state ratification.46
B. The Safe Harbor 
The Safe Harbor is an abnormal regulation that consists of several 
separate documents put together as one. The document sections include: (1) 
the European Commission’s decision that the Safe Harbor program is “ade-
quate;” (2) a description of seven privacy principle requirements that Com-
panies must follow to fulfill the agreement; (3) fifteen frequently asked 
questions and answers that help with statutory interpretation of the seven 
privacy principles; (4) a European Commission memorandum on the suffi-
ciency of the FTC’s enforcement powers; (5) a European Commission me-
morandum on private causes of action for privacy breaches available within 
the U.S.; (6) a letter from the FTC to the European Commission clarifying 
the agency’s enforcement powers; (7) a letter from the Department of 
Transportation to the European Commission clarifying the agency’s en-
forcement powers; and (8) a list of U.S. agencies the European Commission 
has approved to properly enforce the agreement’s requirements.47
42 Applying Article 26(2) of the EU Data Protection Directive to Binding Corporate Rules 
for International Data Transfer (EU Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Working Paper 
74, June 3, 2003) 16. 
43 See Stefano Rodota, OPINION 1/99 Concerning the Level of Data Protection in the 
United States and the Ongoing Discussions between the European Commission and the Unit-
ed States Government (Jan. 26, 1999), http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpd 
ocs/1999/wp15en.pdf. See also, Harvey, supra note 31. Many documents were sent back and 
forth between the EU and the US during the negotiations. See Documents Adopted by the 
Data Protection Working Party 1999, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/working 
group/wpdocs/1999_en.htm.
44 Rulemaking is procedure under administrative law where a U.S. governmental agency 
creates a rule that has the force of law after a notice and comment period. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 
(2006). Further discussion on the requirements of rulemaking and administrative law are 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
45 Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, supra note 5. 
46 Safe Harbor, supra note 6. 
47 Id.
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The Safe Harbor is a voluntary48 self-certification system that is 
unique to the U.S. and requires Companies to treat data on EU Citizens as if 
that data were physically in Europe and subject to the Data Directive.49
1. Safe Harbor registration 
The DOC regulates the self-certification registration of Companies 
under the Safe Harbor and maintains a list of all registered Companies,50
including Companies whose membership has lapsed.51 The DOC reviews 
both the initial applications for the Safe Harbor and the mandatory annual 
renewals.52
To register for the Safe Harbor, a Company simply completes an 
online registration form that requires several disclosures, including a de-
scription of the Company’s data collecting activities, a list of EU countries 
that the Company transfers data to or from, and—most importantly—a de-
scription of the Company’s privacy policy.53 A Company’s privacy policy 
must incorporate and address all of the Safe Harbor privacy principles.54
The Safe Harbor privacy principles are identical to those of the Data Direc-
tive: (1) Notice; (2) Choice; (3) Onward Transfer; (4) Security; (5) Data 
Integration; (6) Access; and (7) Enforcement.55
A Company must swear to the accuracy of the online form it sub-
mits.56 The online form submission therefore is an affirmative representa-
tion of compliance with the Safe Harbor, similar to an affidavit.57 An affir-
mative representation is critical because the FTC can only “take action 
against those who fail to protect the privacy of personal information in ac-
cordance with their representations and/or commitments.”58
48 The Safe Harbor is voluntary because companies can choose to use model contracts to 
Binding Corporate Rules. See supra Part III.A. 
49 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, pmbl. 
50 Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor 
/SH_Overview.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Safe Harbor Overview]. 
51 Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor List, http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf 
/webPages/safe+harbor+list/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Safe Harbor List]. 
52 Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 50. 
53 See WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-27. See also Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor 
Certification Information, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH_Cert_Info.asp (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Safe Harbor Certification Information]. 
54 See WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-27. 
55 See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex I. 
56 See Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Documents, FAQ-7 Verification, 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH_FAQ7.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).  
57 See WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-27. See also Safe Harbor Certification Information, 
supra note 53. 
58 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex III. 
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The DOC tests the online privacy policies of registering Companies 
“to the greatest extent possible.”59 The DOC, however, admits that when a 
Company’s privacy policy is not readily available online, it merely “con-
firm[s] with the contact point that the policy is available upon request.”60
The DOC rejects approximately fifty-percent of all initial Safe Harbor ap-
plications due to deficiencies in at least one area.61
2.  The Safe Harbor Notice, Choice, Onward Transfer, Security, Data 
Integration, and Access Principles 
The Notice Principle requires a Safe Harbor Company to “inform 
individuals about the purposes for which it collects and uses information 
about them, how to contact the organization with any inquiries or com-
plaints, [and] the types of third parties to which it discloses the informa-
tion.”62 This disclosure must occur prior to using collected information and 
preferably before individuals are asked to provide personal information.63
The Choice Principle requires a Safe Harbor Company to allow cus-
tomers to either “opt-in” or “opt-out” of information sharing depending on 
the nature of the information. For highly personal information,64 the Choice 
Principle requires customers to affirmatively “opt-in” to information sharing 
with a third party. For all other types of information, a Company still must 
give the customer the choice to “opt-out.”  
The Onward Transfer Principle requires a Safe Harbor Company 
ensure that either the Safe Harbor or the Data Directive binds any “middle-
man” third party agent that receives the data at issue.65 Alternatively, the 
Company and a “middle-man” agent may sign an agreement incorporating 
all of the Safe Harbor principles.66
The Security Principle, although only one sentence in length, is crit-
ical to the Safe Harbor. It requires a Company to “take reasonable precau-
59 Damon C. Greer, The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework: Data Protection and Cross 
Border Personal Data Transfers, notes accompanying slide 10, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_ 
home/news/information_dossiers/conference_personal_data/doc/greer.ppt (last visited Mar. 
30, 2008) [hereinafter U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework PowerPoint]. 
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex I. 
63 Id.
64 Highly personal information is defined as “personal information specifying medical or 
health conditions, racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, 
trade union membership or information specifying the sex life of the individual.” Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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tions to protect [all data] from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclo-
sure, alteration and destruction.”67
The Data Integration Principle requires a Safe Harbor Company to 
process data only in a manner compatible with “the purposes for which it 
has been collected or subsequently authorized by the individual.”68 Addi-
tionally, a Safe Harbor Company must ensure that all data collected is “reli-
able for its intended use, accurate, complete, and current.”69
The Access Principle requires a Company registered with the Safe 
Harbor to make its files available upon request to any EU Citizen the Com-
pany has collected information about. An EU Citizen may request to view, 
correct and amend his or her information in the Company’s files.70 A Com-
pany may charge a reasonable fee for providing access.71 There are several 
exceptions to the Access Principle,72 but they are beyond the scope of this 
Note and will not be discussed here. 
3.  The Safe Harbor Enforcement Principle  
For the purposes of this Note, the most important provision is the 
Enforcement Principle. At its basic level, the Enforcement Principle has 
three components: (1) a resolution system using an “independent recourse 
mechanism;” (2) a privacy policy verification mechanism; and (3) a guaran-
tee to remedy.73 The first component, the “independent recourse mechan-
ism,” must be “readily available and affordable” to a potential complai-
nant.74 Second, a Company must have a verification mechanism that shows 
all privacy practice assertions are true and implemented.75 Finally, a Com-
pany must obligate itself to resolve any issues that arise from a determina-
tion made by the “independent recourse mechanism.”76
a.  The Enforcement Principle’s independent recourse mechanism re-
quirement
The Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse mechanism” is 
likely a result of EU concessions to DOC negotiators. The “independent 
67 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex I. 
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. annex II. 
72 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II.
73 Id. annex I. 
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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recourse mechanism” parallels other U.S. privacy laws that exclusively re-
medy violations through civil suits.77 As its name implies, an “independent 
recourse mechanism” uses private-sector organizations to help Companies 
“self-regulate” their data collection and uses. 
The Enforcement Principle allows Companies to use one of four 
types of “independent recourse mechanisms.”78 First, several private-sector 
privacy programs are available which meet the Safe Harbor requirements79
such as BBBOnline80 or TRUSTe.81 Second, a Company can commit to 
cooperate with the EU member states’ Data Protection Authority.82 Third, 
Companies may seek out other private sector “independent recourse me-
chanism” bodies that “meet the requirements of the Enforcement Principle 
and the FAQs.”83 Finally, the Safe Harbor allows Companies to “compl[y] 
with legal or regulatory supervisory authorities that provide for handling of 
individual complaints and dispute resolution.”84 While at least one leading 
authority on privacy law ignores this option,85 some Companies interpret 
this language to include a Company’s own internal complaint process as an 
“independent recourse mechanism.”86
b.  The Enforcement Principle’s Verification Requirement  
The Enforcement Principle’s Verification Requirement obligates 
Companies to verify that their stated privacy practices are implemented.87 A 
Company registering for the Safe Harbor can verify its privacy policies in 
one of two ways. The first option allows a Company to submit to annual 
77 See Bignami, supra note 26, at 684. 
78 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II. 
79 See id.
80 See US Better Business Bureau, EU Safe Harbor, http://www.bbbonline.org/privacy/e 
u.asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2008) (describing BBBOnline’s self-regulatory Safe Harbor 
compliance program). 
81 See TRUSTe, http://www.truste.org/businesses/eu_safe_harbor_seal.php (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2008) (describing TRUSTe’s self-regulatory Safe Harbor compliance program). 
82 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II. 
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-26. 
86 See, e.g., Safe Harbor Registration of Adaptec, Inc., http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor 
/shlist.nsf/5624e34187d9c4dc85256960005fc648/b0893a8186c1fd0885256b7200572945?Op
enDocument (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) (listing its “independent recourse mechanism” as 
“Consumer or Adaptec employee complaints will generally be escalated internally to the 
Adaptec corporate legal department which will consult with management on appropriate 
response or action depending on the facts at issue”). Only after going through Adaptec’s 
process unsuccessfully will they refer the matter to a Data Protection Authority. This troub-
ling interpretation is discussed in Part V of this Note. See infra Part V.B.1.b.iii. 
87 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II. 
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outside compliance reviews.88 Additionally, the Safe Harbor suggests that 
Companies submit themselves to “without limitation auditing, random re-
views, [and] use of ‘decoys.’”89 The other option allows a Company to 
“self-verify.” Under this option, a Company must merely submit an annual 
written verification—signed by a corporate officer or authorized representa-
tive—stating that the Company’s published privacy policy is “accurate, 
comprehensive, prominently displayed, completely implemented and ac-
cessible.”90 Additionally, the “self-verification” document must list internal 
procedures for periodically conducting objective reviews of compliance 
with the Safe Harbor.91
c.  The Enforcement Principle’s Guarantee to Remedy Requirement  
The Enforcement Principle’s Guarantee to Remedy Requirement is 
usually satisfied through a Company’s “independent recourse mechanism.” 
When a Company’s chosen “independent recourse mechanism” determines 
there is a violation, the Safe Harbor suggests several remedies of varying 
degree based on the level of the violation.92 At a minimum, any remedy 
should reverse the effects of the violation, ensure future processing com-
plies with the Safe Harbor Principles and publish the non-compliance find-
ings.93 Any “independent recourse mechanism,” however, must notify both 
the DOC and the governmental body with applicable jurisdiction—usually 
the FTC—if a Company fails to comply with the procedures and remedies 
demanded by its “independent recourse mechanism.”94 The Safe Harbor 
suggests “independent recourse mechanism” bodies use further sanctions, 
such as, stopping the processing of the complainant’s personal data, deleting 
the data at issue, removing an “independent recourse mechanism[’]s” priva-
cy program seal, and compensating a complainant for any losses incurred.95
The Enforcement Principle’s self-regulatory means of enforcement 
through an “independent recourse mechanism,” verification, and a guaran-
tee to remedy, however, is only one part of the Safe Harbor’s overall en-
forcement scheme.96
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing how “self-verification” is contrary to the intent of the 
Safe Harbor). 
92 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II. 
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 See infra Part III.C.2.a (explaining the “big picture” of the Safe Harbor “layer” method 
of enforcement). 
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C. Government Data Protection Enforcement Mechanisms 
1. Data Directive enforcement in the EU
The Data Directive requires enforcement solely through a govern-
ment agency.97Accordingly, each EU member state is required to create a 
Data Protection Authority.98 The Data Protection Authority is a government 
agency whose sole responsibility is to protect privacy through the enforce-
ment of the Data Directive and other data protection laws.99 Some EU 
member states’ Data Protection Authorities require all data collectors and 
processors to file annual reports.100 For example, France’s Data Protection 
Authority goes so far to require data collectors and processors to be ap-
proved prior to beginning operations.101 The Data Protection Authorities are 
required to be proactive, self-initiate an investigation, and enforce possible 
or potential violations in data processing operations.102 Under the Data Di-
rective EU Citizens must be given the right to object to their data being 
processed and a data processor must have an objection process that does not 
charge a fee.103 Additionally, EU Citizens can initiate private rights of ac-
tion,104 and Data Protection Authorities give prior privacy adjudications a 
res judicata effect when litigating new cases.105
2.  Safe Harbor Enforcement in the United States 
a.  Safe Harbor enforcement—the big picture  
Enforcement under the Safe Harbor follows a multiple “layer” ap-
proach. The Enforcement Principle106 only encompasses one “layer” of the 
Safe Harbor’s means of enforcement. The first enforcement “layer” is the 
initial Safe Harbor registration and subsequent annual Safe Harbor registra-
tion renewals, run by the DOC.107 The second “layer” is the Enforcement 
Principle’s “independent recourse mechanism.”108 The final “layer” is gov-
ernment intervention, usually through the FTC.  
97 Data Directive, supra note 3, art. 28. 
98 Id. art. 28(1). 
99 See id. art. 28(1). 
100 The Data Directive requires annual reports. Data Directive, supra note 3, arts. 18–19. 
101 WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-14. 
102 See Data Directive, supra note 3, art. 20. See also id. art. 28.
103 Id. art. 14. 
104 Id. art. 22–24.
105 See id. art. 28(5). 
106 See supra Part III.B.3. 
107 See supra Part III.B.1. 
108 See supra Part III.B.3.a. 
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To resolve a complaint, an EU Citizen should first directly contact a 
Company. Second, he or she could seek recourse through the Enforcement 
Principle by referencing the Company’s privacy policy and contacting the 
Company’s “independent recourse mechanism.” Finally, if a Company fails 
to fulfill the remedy, if any, demanded by its “independent recourse me-
chanism,” then the “independent recourse mechanism” must refer the matter 
to the U.S. governmental agency that has jurisdiction over the Company, 
usually the FTC.109 The last “layer,” U.S. agency enforcement, is discussed 
in the next section. 
b. U.S. Agency Safe Harbor enforcement  
As part of each Company’s initial registration for the Safe Harbor 
with the DOC, each Company must state which “[s]pecific statutory body    
. . . has jurisdiction to hear any claims against the organization regarding 
possible unfair or deceptive practices and violations of laws or regulations 
governing privacy.”110 Since the inception of the Safe Harbor, only two 
government agencies have assured the European Commission that they will 
take enforcement actions against Companies that fail to abide by their Safe 
Harbor commitments.111 The two agencies are the FTC and the Department 
of Transportation.112
This Note will discuss the FTC’s effectiveness under the Safe Har-
bor in light of its broad authority to regulate any “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce”113 under the Federal Trade Commission 
Act (FTC Act).114 In contrast, the Department of Transportation’s authority 
is limited to the much smaller subset of common carrier issues, and thus the 
Department of Transportation’s enforcement authority will not be discussed 
in this Note.  
The FTC can only initiate action against companies that have first 
made a representation.115 Therefore, as previously discussed,116 A Compa-
ny’s Safe Harbor registration acts as an affirmative representation by a 
109 See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II. 
110 Safe Harbor Certification Information, supra note 53. 
111 See Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 50. 
112 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex VII. 
113 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
114 15 U.S.C §§ 41–58 (2006). 
115 See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex III. (“[T]he Federal Trade Commission … [can 
only] take action against those who fail to protect the privacy of personal information in 
accordance with their representations and/or commitments.”) (emphasis added). 
116 See supra Part III.B.1. 
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Company, similar to an affidavit.117 If a Company fails to comply with its 
Safe Harbor commitment, then the FTC has the power to prosecute the false 
representation as a deceptive action.118
The FTC can seek several types of remedies on behalf of consum-
ers. After conducting a formal hearing, the FTC may issue a cease and des-
ist order,119 seek restraining orders or injunctions,120 and—in more severe 
cases—may promulgate an administrative rule barring an act or practice as 
per se unfair or deceptive.121 The FTC may fine a Company up to $10,000 
for each failure to comply with a FTC order122 or for violating a FTC rule.123
IV. THE GOOGLE-DOUBLE CLICK MERGER: A CASE STUDY IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION’S DETERIORATING TRUST IN THE U.S. PRIVACY
REGULATORY SCHEME
EU member states and their citizens are forced to rely on Safe Har-
bor enforcement “layer” entities that are outside the realm of EU political 
control. Neither the “independent recourse mechanisms” nor U.S. agencies, 
such as the FTC, have any incentive to pursue Safe Harbor violation claims 
because both “independent recourse mechanisms” and the FTC are unac-
countable to EU Citizens. It is as if the EU decided to rely on an unpaid 
mercenary force to protect its data “borders” with the U.S. Therefore, EU 
Citizens have no choice but to rely on Safe Harbor enforcement bodies that 
are politically unaccountable to them, have little incentive to pursue claims, 
and have taken little action over the seven-year period since the Safe Har-
bor’s inception.124
This is not a small problem. In 2004, the U.S. and its top six Euro-
pean trade partners traded approximately $400 billion in goods and servic-
es.125 It is likely that Companies hold some of EU Citizens’ most vulnerable 
data,126 yet that data resides where there is poor enforcement, and little in-
117 See WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-27. See also Safe Harbor Certification Information, 
supra note 53. 
118 See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex III. 
119 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006). 
120 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2006). 
121 15 U.S.C. § 57a(1)(B) (2006). 
122 15 U.S.C. § 45(k)(1) (2006). 
123 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1) (2006). 
124 See infra Part V. 
125 U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework PowerPoint, supra note 59, at slide 3. 
126 The Safe Harbor program includes the registration of over 1600 companies. Safe Harbor 
List, supra note 51. The business sectors of those companies include market research firms, 
such as Harris Interactive Inc., and large internet retailers, such as Amazon.com, Inc. Id.
(follow links to specific companies listed alphabetically). 
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centive to invest in protecting the data.127 Many EU Citizens question the 
effectiveness of the U.S. self-regulatory model of privacy regulation and 
enforcement. The deteriorating trust makes it all the more important for 
citizens of EU member states to have their confidence reassured by streng-
thened Safe Harbor enforcement mechanisms.128 This section explores the 
different approaches used by the EU Commission on Competition and FTC 
Bureau of Competition for regulating Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick, 
an online advertising company. This example demonstrates the EU’s fading 
confidence in the U.S. self-regulatory model of privacy regulation and en-
forcement.129
A. Google’s Significant Collected Data 
In August, 2007, 210 million individuals in Europe made 18 billion 
search requests on the Google search engine.130 Google “obsessively files 
away most every scrap of data it receives,”131 but Google recently enacted a 
policy to “remov[e] identifying data from its search logs after 18 months to 
two years” and that after eighteen months, the information it collects does 
not include the personal identity of a user.132 While this is technically true, 
with an average of 86 search inquiries per European citizen in August of 
2007 it is not difficult to put separate search patterns together to identify a 
unique individual.133 The longer Google retains data on a person, the more 
“complete” a picture both Google, and potential data thieves, have about a 
127 See infra Part V. 
128 See id.
129 Notice that some of the issues raised by the EU over Google’s policies involve addition-
al EU privacy directives that were passed subsequent to the Data Directive. This Note does 
not discuss the specific legal sections or arguments because they are beyond the scope of this 
Note.
130 Richard Holt, Google Powers Half the World’s Web Searches, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Nov. 
10, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/connected/main.jhtml?xml=/connected/2007/10/11/ 
dlgoogle111.xml. 
131 Posting of Saul Hansell to N.Y. Times Bits Blog, As Ask Erases Little, Google and 
Others Keep Writing About You, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/12/as-ask-erases-
little-google-and-others-keep-writing-about-you (Dec. 12, 2007, 12:44 EST). 
132 Posting of Ryan Singel to Wired Threat Level Blog, Google to Anonymize Data,
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/03/google_to_anony.html (Mar. 14, 2007, 15:45 
EST). 
133 For example, the same person may make the following searches: “Fish and chips in 
Cotswolds,” “Ancestry of sir name Clarkson,” “Ferrari F430,” “Chipping Norton noise pollu-
tion laws.” Alone, the searches may mean little. Together, they can pinpoint a specific per-
son, in this case, Jeremy Clarkson, a presenter on BBC Two’s “Top Gear” television pro-
gram.
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person. Google’s goal in retaining consumer data is simple: to gain a unique 
understanding of its users to target advertising.134
B. Initial European Union Concerns with Google’s Data Retention 
Practices
As early as April, 2004, the EU began to raise concerns over 
Google’s data retention practices.135 In May, 2007, the Article 29 Working 
Party136 sent an official letter137 to Google, asking for an explanation of why 
it keeps user data for two full years.138 In June 2007, Peter Fleischer, 
Google’s Chief Privacy Counsel, responded that Google would reduce its 
data retention to eighteen months.139 Mr. Fleischer argued that data retention 
serves as an “important tool for law enforcement to investigate and prose-
cute many serious crimes, such as child exploitation” and he “firmly re-
ject[ed] any suggestions that [Google] could meet [its] legitimate interests 
in security, innovation and anti-fraud efforts with any retention period 
shorter than 18 months.”140 Some observers believe that Google is using law 
enforcement and national security concerns as a cover-up for its actual in-
tentions of targeting advertising.141 In an October 2007 reply, the Article 29 
Working Party acknowledged that that Mr. Fleischer had “raised several 
issues about processing [] personal data” with regard to search engines and 
that the group would release an opinion on these issues “in early 2008.”142
134 See Posting of Saul Hansell, supra note 131. 
135 Posting of Mike Masnick to Tech Dirt Blog, Does Gmail Break The Law?,
http://techdirt.com/articles/20040405/1033231.shtml (Apr. 5, 2004, 10:34 EST). 
136 This group, created by Data Directive article 29, is composed of national officials that 
advise the EU on privacy policy. Data Directive, supra note 3, art. 29. 
137 Letter from Peter Schaar, Chairman of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, to 
Peter Fleischer, Privacy Counsel to Google (May 16, 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/justice_ho 
me/fsj/privacy/news/docs/pr_google_16_05_07_en.pdf. 
138 Maija Palmer, EU Probes Google Grip on Data, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 24, 2007, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/dc89ec96-0a24-11dc-93ae-000b5df10621.html. 
139 Letter from Peter Fleischer, Global Privacy Counsel to Google, to Peter Schaar, Chair-
man of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (June 10, 2007),
http://64.233.179.110/blog_resources/Google_response_Working_Party_06_2007.pdf. 
140 Id.
141 See, e.g., Posting of Joe Weisenthal to Tech Dirt Blog, Is Google Making Up Fake Laws 
In Order To Cover For Its Retention Policies?, http://techdirt.com/articles/20070712/1119 
43.shtml (July 12, 2007, 16:44 EST); Posting of Ryan Singel to Wired Threat Level Blog,
Google Still Using E.U. Data Retention Ruse to Justify Massive Data Collection,
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/07/google-still-us.html (July 12, 2007, 12:46 EST). 
142 Letter from Peter Schaar, Chairman of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, to 
Peter Fleischer, Global Privacy Counsel to Google (Oct. 12, 2007), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/others/2007_10_12_reply_to_goog
le_en.pdf.  
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C. The Google-DoubleClick Merger 
In April 2007, Google bought the online advertising firm Double-
Click for $3.1 billion dollars, its largest acquisition to date.143 Google and 
DoubleClick both advertise online, but with slightly different specialties. 
Google’s advertising division, AdSense, helps display advertising directly 
on a website, which generates revenue for the website owners. Google 
crawls144 the content of the page on which the ad is to be displayed, and 
AdSense generates advertising for various companies that the website’s 
visitors would likely be interested in.145 DoubleClick, however, supplies 
various advertisers and website publishers with elaborate plans for the deli-
very, management and reporting of web-displayed ads.146 It uses “Web sur-
fers’ interaction with ads to determine how to place the most effective dis-
play ads.”147 DoubleClick’s approach to advertising is called “behavioral 
advertising.” The primary difference is that Google’s AdSense ads are 
usually text only and relate to the contents of the page on which the ads 
appear;148 DoubleClick’s advertisements, in contrast, are usually large im-
age or video banners and are directed to an audience based on prior user 
viewing habits.149
1.  The Federal Trade Commission investigation 
The Google purchase of DoubleClick raised the ire of several priva-
cy groups because “DoubleClick and Google [could] combine some of their 
huge databases of information on Internet use.”150 On April 20, 2007, three 
privacy advocacy groups—the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the 
Center for Digital Democracy, and the U.S. Public Interest Research 
Group—filed a joint complaint with the FTC alleging that the merger would 
143 Louise Story, Google Buys an Online Ad Firm for $3.1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 
2007, at C1. 
144 This is a term for when a search engine visits a website and creates a “snapshot” of 
website’s content. 
145 Google, Welcome to AdSense, https://www.google.com/adsense/ (last visited Aug. 30, 
2008).
146 See DoubleClick, What We Do, http://www.doubleclick.com/about/what_we_do.aspx 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2008). 
147 Story, supra note 143. 
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. (“You can dive deep into that data and say who were those people, where do they 
live, what were they doing when they looked at those ads?”). 
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give Google access “to more information about the Internet activities of 
consumers than any other company in the world.”151
Despite the privacy groups’ concerns, mergers and acquisitions are 
evaluated under anti-trust law. Both the FTC Bureau of Competition and the 
Department of Justice can review anti-trust allegations. The FTC Bureau of 
Competition was selected to review the Google-DoubleClick merger in late 
May 2007.152 This was a significant and favorable development for the pri-
vacy groups because although “[c]onsumer protection issues are not consi-
dered as factors in whether the Department of Justice or the FTC Bureau of 
Competition is chosen to review a merger,” once the FTC Bureau of Com-
petition is selected, it can take account of possible violations of section five 
of the FTC Act.153
Adding to the controversy, politicians and a newspaper editorial 
raised privacy concerns about the merger. On June 13, 2007, the New York 
Times featured an editorial calling on the FTC to address the privacy impli-
cations of the merger, in addition to the anti-trust implications.154 The edi-
torial stated that “[p]rivacy is too important to leave up to the companies 
that benefit financially from collecting and retaining data.”155 The editorial 
forewarned that Google's acquisition of DoubleClick could mean that the 
post-merger Google “could track more sensitive information—like what 
diseases users have, or what political causes they support.” 156
In September 2007, during a U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee 
meeting on the merger, Senator Herbert Kohl stated that he believes the 
Committee should consider the privacy implications of the merger, in oppo-
sition the beliefs of some anti-trust regulators.157 Sen. Kohl continued, say-
151 Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief, 
Google, Inc. and DoubleClick, Inc. (FTC 2007), http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/epic_com 
plaint.pdf. The groups subsequently filed supplements in June and September. Supplemental 
Materials in Support of Pending Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investi-
gation and for Other Relief, Google, Inc. and DoubleClick, Inc. (FTC 2007), 
http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/supp_060607.pdf; Second Filing of Supplemental Mate-
rials in Support of Pending Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation 
and for Other Relief, Google, Inc. and DoubleClick, Inc. (FTC 2007), 
http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/supp2_091707.pdf. 
152 Steve Lohr, Google Deal Said to Bring U.S. Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at C1. 
153 Posting of Ari Schwartz to Center for Democracy and Technology PolicyBeta Blog, 
FTC Should Address Google-DoubleClick Privacy Issues, http://blog.cdt.org/2007/05/29/ftc-
should-address-google-doubleclick-privacy-issues/ (May 29, 2007).  
154 Editorial, Watching Your Every Move, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2007, at A20. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 An Examination of the Google-DoubleClick Merger and the Online Advertising Indus-
try: What Are the Risks for Competition and Privacy?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. (2007) (statement of Sen. Herbert Kohl), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hear 
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ing that the anti-trust laws were written for the purpose of limiting “undue 
concentrations of economic power for our society as a whole, and not just 
merely their effects on consumers’ pocketbooks.”158 At the same meeting, 
Senator Patrick Leahy supplemented the statements of Sen. Kohl. Sen. 
Leahy said that “Most online users are unaware of how and when informa-
tion about their online activity is being used,” and companies that collect 
personal data “have an obligation to safeguard such data.”159
Google responded to the concerns of politicians and privacy groups 
at the same U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee meeting. David Drummond, 
Google’s Senior Vice President for Corporate Development and Chief Legal 
Officer, spoke on Google’s behalf. In his testimony, Mr. Drummond argued 
that competition is what keeps Google’s privacy practices in line, stating 
that “[u]ser interests effectively regulate our behavior.”160 Google subse-
quently published several documents on its public policy blog,161 including 
talking points on the merger162 and quotes from various sources that have 
commented positively about Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick.163
During the FTC Bureau of Competition’s investigation of the 
Google-DoubleClick merger, an officer in the FTC Bureau of Competition 
itself became a target of the same privacy groups that filed the original 
complaint. On December 12, 2007, the privacy groups called for FTC 
Chairperson Deborah Platt Majoras to recuse herself164 because her hus-
band, John Majoras, works as a partner in the anti-trust section of the Jones 
Day law firm—a firm that represents DoubleClick in international mat-
ings/hearing.cfm?id=2955. 
158 Id.
159 Id. (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).  
160 Id. (statement of David Drummond, Senior Vice President of Corporate Development 
and Chief Legal Officer, Google).  
161 Google Public Policy Blog, http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/ (last visited Aug. 
30, 2008). 
162 Google, Google-DoubleClick Acquisition Background Information, http://services.goo 
gle.com/blog_resources/google_doubleclick_background.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2007). 
163 Google, What People Are Saying About the Google-DoubleClick Acquisition,
http://64.233.179.110/blog_resources/what_people_are_saying.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 
2007).
164 Complaint Requesting Recusal of the Federal Trade Commission Chairman from the 
Pending Review of the Proposed Google-DoubleClick Merger, Google, Inc. and DoubleC-
lick, Inc. (FTC 2007), http://www.epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/recusal_121207.pdf. See also
Donald S. Clark, Federal Trade Commission Secretary, letter to EPIC Executive Director 
Marc Rotenberg (Dec. 14, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/12/071214letter.pdf; Consumer
Groups Seek Recusal of FTC Head, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Dec. 12, 2007), 
http://www.fool.com/news/associated-press/2007/12/12/consumer-groups-seek-recusal-of-
ftc-head.aspx; Groups say FTC, law firm hiding DoubleClick conflict, Breaking Legal News 
Blog, Dec. 14, 2007, http://www.breakinglegalnews.com/entry/Groups-say-FTC-law-firm-
hiding-DoubleClick-conflict/. 
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ters.165 Ms. Majoras nevertheless refused to recuse herself, stating that her 
husband has no financial interest in the outcome of the merger regulator 
decision because he is no longer an equity partner at Jones Day, and there-
fore she has no conflict of interest.166
On December 21, 2007, the FTC Bureau of Competition approved 
the merger of Google and DoubleClick, without condition, in a 4–1 opi-
nion.167 The FTC Bureau of Competition ignored privacy concerns, stating 
that Google is only a small part of the online advertising world and privacy 
issues “extend to the entire online advertising marketplace.”168 The majority 
opinion of the FTC Bureau of Competition stated that it “lack[ed] legal au-
thority to require conditions to this merger that do not relate to antitrust, 
[and] regulating the privacy requirements of just one company could itself 
pose a serious detriment to competition in this vast and rapidly evolving 
industry.”169 The decision lacked any substantive analysis of the privacy 
issues at stake, and in three short sentences dismissed all privacy concerns: 
We investigated the possibility that this transaction could adversely affect 
non-price attributes of competition, such as consumer privacy. We have 
concluded that the evidence does not support a conclusion that it would do 
so. We have therefore concluded that privacy considerations, as such, do 
not provide a basis to challenge this transaction.170
FTC Commissioner Jon Leibowitz issued a concurring statement that ad-
dressed the privacy concerns more directly.171 Mr. Leibowitz stated that 
“industry participants must stop being coy and start being more forthcoming 
about their practices, the consumer information they collect, and how they 
165 Jones Day, Professional Biography: John M. Majoras, http://www.jonesday.com/jmm 
ajoras/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).  
166 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras Concerning Peti-
tion Seeking My Recusal from Review of Proposed Acquisition of Hellman & Friedman 
Capital Partners V, LP (DoubleClick Inc.) by Google, Inc., Dec. 14, 2007, 
http://ftc.gov/opa/2007/12/google.shtm. See also Regulator Won’t Step Aside in Google 
Review, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/15/technology/15go 
ogle.html. 
167 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal Trade Commission Close 
Google/DoubleClick Investigation (Dec. 20, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/12/google 
dc.shtm. See also Louise Story, F.T.C. Approves DoubleClick Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/21/business/21adco.html.
168 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC FILE NO. 071-0170, STATEMENT OF FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION CONCERNING GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK at 2, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710 
170/071220statement.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).  
169 Id.
170 Id. at 2–3. 
171 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC FILE NO. 071-0170, CONCURRING STATEMENT OF 
COMMISSIONER JON LIEBOWITZ IN THE MATTER OF GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220leib.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).  
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use it.”172 Mr. Leibowitz recommended two actions. First, he said that the 
FTC should use its power to subpoena information from Companies that 
have large troves of data when they are not forthcoming with how they use 
the data.173 Second, the FTC should require that consumers must “opt-in” to 
receive targeted advertising.174
FTC Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour was the lone dissent. 
Ms. Harbour stated that the FTC Bureau of Competition closed its investi-
gation too soon to address all competition and privacy issues.175 She con-
demned the FTC’s failure to follow its dual role for protecting against both 
consumer violations and anti-trust violations. She stated that “the Commis-
sion could have utilized the full scope of its statutory powers to ensure 
competition was not harmed, while also addressing the privacy issues.”176
Commissioner Harbour directly addressed the privacy advocates’ 
concerns and stated that she was “uncomfortable accepting the merging 
parties nonbinding representations at face value. . . . The merger creates a 
firm with vast knowledge of consumer preferences, subject to very little 
accountability.”177 She added that there is a “disconnect between the finan-
cial incentives of advertisers and publishers (i.e., to exploit data) and the 
privacy incentives of some consumers (i.e., to protect data).”178 Finally, 
Commissioner Harbour suggested that the U.S. Congress should consider 
“whether comprehensive privacy legislation (including, but not limited to, 
behavioral advertising) is needed.” 179
Google and its opponents reacted as expected. Google hailed the 
ruling stating that it “firmly believe[s] the transaction will increase competi-
tion and bring substantial benefits to consumers, web publishers, and online 
advertisers.”180 The Electronic Privacy Information Center condemned the 
ruling, stating it was a mistake for the Commissioners “to ignore the privacy 
172 Id at 2. 
173 See id. at 2 n.3. 
174 See id. at 3. 
175 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC FILE NO. 071-0170, DISSENTING STATEMENT OF 
COMMISSIONER PAMELA HARBOUR IN THE MATTER OF GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220harbour.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) (“If 
the Commission closes its investigation at this time, without imposing any conditions on the 
merger, neither the competition nor the privacy interests of consumers will have been ade-
quately addressed.”). 
176 Id. at 13.  
177 Id. at 9–10 (emphasis added). 
178 Id. at 11–12. 
179 Id. at 12. 
180 Posting of David Drummond to Google Public Policy Blog, Analysis: The FTC Clears 
Our Acquisition of DoubleClick, http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2007/12/analysis-
ftc-clears-our-acquisition-of.html (Dec. 20, 2007, 13:49 PST). 
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implications of the Google-DoubleClick merger and to propose instead the 
same self-regulatory approach to privacy protection that has repeatedly 
failed American consumers.”181
2.  European Union Investigation 
Google also had to pass an investigation by the EU Commission on 
Competition to complete its acquisition of DoubleClick. On September 21, 
2007, Google applied to the EU Commission on Competition for permission 
to merge with DoubleClick.182 Yet before receiving Google’s official appli-
cation, the EU Commission on Competition took the “unusual step of send-
ing questionnaires to Google customers before the company officially” 
sought permission to acquire DoubleClick.183
Early in the EU Commission on Competition’s investigation, 
Google’s chances of acquiring DoubleClick appeared grim. In June 2007, 
long before Google filed its merger application, a European consumer 
group, BEUC, petitioned the Commission to prevent the merger.184 Later, in 
late September 2007, the Data Protection Commissioner of the German fed-
eral state of Schleswig-Holstein sent a letter, to the EU Commission on 
Competition recommending the agency reject the merger.185 In the letter, the 
German Data Protection Commissioner stated that it had to assume that in 
the event of a takeover of DoubleClick the databases of that company will 
be integrated into those of Google, with the result that fundamental provi-
sions of the European Data Protection Directive will be violated.186 The 
German Data Protection Commissioner also stated that if the merger oc-
curred, a wealth of user data and detailed individual profiles would be 
created without the knowledge of the individuals concerned, and individuals 
181 Press Release, Marc Rotenberg, Statement Regarding the Majority Opinion of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission in Proposed Acquisition of Doubleclick (Dec. 20, 2007), 
http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/EPIC_statement122007.pdf.
182 Procedures Relating to the Implementation of the Competition Policy 2007 O.J. (C 230) 
12, Oct. 2, 2007, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:230 
:0012:0012:EN:PDF. 
183 EU Questions Google Customers Over DoubleClick, REUTERS, Sept. 6, 2007, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUKBRU00592120070906. 
184 Letter from Jim Murray et al., BEUC Directors, to Neelie Kroes, European Commis-
sioner (June 27, 2007), http://docshare.beuc.org/Common/GetFile.asp?ID=23759&mfd=of 
f&LogonName=Guesten.
185 Schreiben des Leiters des ULD Dr. Thilo Weichert an die Kommissarin der Europais-
chen Kommission Neelie Kroes zum Wettbewerbsverfahren ween der Ubernahme des Inter-
net Werbeyermarkters DoubleClick durch Google [Letter from Dr. Thilo Weichert, the Head 
of the ULD, to Commissioner Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner] (Sept. 26, 2007), 
https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/suchmaschinen/20070926-doubleclick-google.html. 
186 Id.
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would be without the ability to assert their rights.187 Finally, the German 
Data Protection Commissioner stated that it was of no significance that both 
Google and DoubleClick are members of the Safe Harbor188 because the 
merging of data and the evaluation and the use of personalized advertising 
takes place in the U.S., and data merging is specifically against the Euro-
pean data protection directive.189
Google fought back in October 2007 by promising to “keep certain 
DoubleClick business practices unchanged,”190 meaning that Google would 
segregate its own AdSense advertising division from the newly acquired 
DoubleClick. The EU Commission on Competition announced on Novem-
ber 13, 2007 that it would prefer to have the issue debated further and 
opened an in-depth investigation,191 postponing a decision to April 2, 
2008.192 Nevertheless, Google remained confident following its merger ap-
proval in the U.S. and hoped that the EU Commission on Competition 
would follow suit.193
On March 11, 2008, the EU Commission on Competition approved 
the Google-DoubleClick merger.194 Similar to the FTC Bureau of Competi-
tion’s anti-trust analysis, the EU Commission on Competition did not eva-
luate or take into account the privacy implications of the merger.195 The 
187 Id.
188 Google Privacy Center: Privacy Policy, http://www.google.co.uk/privacypolicy.html 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2008) (“Google adheres to the US Safe Harbor Privacy Principles of 
Notice, Choice, Onward Transfer, Security, Data Integrity, Access and Enforcement and is 
registered with the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Safe Harbor Programme.”); DoubleC-
lick Privacy: Europe/Safe Harbor, http://www.doubleclick.com/privacy/europe.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2008). 
189 Letter from Dr. Thilo Weichert, supra note 185. 
190 Victoria Shannon, Google Hits European Hurdle on DoubleClick Deal, The New York 
Times (Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/technology/14google.html. 
191 Press Release, European Commission, European Commission opens in-depth investiga-
tion into Google’s proposed take over of DoubleClick (Nov. 13, 2007), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1688&format=HTML&aged
=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
192 European Commission Competition Cases from 4700-4749, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ 
competition/mergers/cases/index/m94.html#m_4731 (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) (listing the 
provisional deadline of the deadline of the Google/DoubleClick case as Apr. 2, 2008). 
193 See Google Focuses on EU Review, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 21, 2007, at C3. 
194 Press Release, European Commission on Competition, Mergers: Commission Clears 
Proposed Acquisition of DoubleClick by Google (Mar. 11, 2008), http://europa.eu/rapid/p 
ressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/426&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui 
Language=en. The European Commission has also made the full text available. Commission 
Regulation 139/2004, 2008 O.J. (C 184) 10, http://ec.europa.eu/com 
m/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4731_20080311_20682_en.pdf. 
195 See Associated Press, Europe Clears Google DoubleClick Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/11/technology/apee-google.html (“Regulators said 
their decision was based exclusively on the economic aspects of the deal and it had no bear-
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European Commission on Competition stated that the “decision to clear the 
proposed merger is based exclusively on its appraisal under the EU Merger 
Regulation.”196 The European Commission on Competition stressed that its 
decision was “without prejudice to the merged entity’s obligations under 
EU legislation in relation to the protection of individuals and the protection 
of privacy with regard to the processing of personal data.”197
D. Future EU Regulation of Google, Search Engines, and Behavioral 
Advertising
Although Google cleared all anti-trust regulatory bodies in the U.S. 
and Europe, Google still will face other EU governmental bodies that will 
continue to scrutinize its privacy practices, now that it has acquired Doub-
leClick. For example, on January 21, 2008, the European Parliament con-
ducted a formal hearing entitled “Data protection on the Internet” that pri-
marily focused on the proposed Google-DoubleClick merger.198 Interesting-
ly, Ms. Pamela Harbour, the lone dissent in the FTC Bureau of Competi-
tion’s ruling on the Google-DoubleClick merger,199 testified on behalf of the 
FTC at the European Parliament hearing.200 At the hearing, Peter Schaar, 
head of Germany’s Data Protection Authority, made the significant asser-
tion that internet protocol addresses (IP addresses)201 should be treated as 
personal information.202 If later EU interpretations of the Data Directive 
hold that IP addresses are personal information, it would mean that Google, 
ing on the companies’ obligations under E.U. personal privacy protection rules or how per-
sonal data is processed.”). 
196 Press Release, European Commission on Competition, supra note 194. 
197 Id.
198 European Parliament, Jan. 21, 2008, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Commit-
tee, Hearing regarding Data protection on the internet: Google-Doubleclick and other case 
studies, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/hearingsCom.do
?language=EN&body=LIBE. The program for the entire hearing is available online. Euro-
pean Parliament, Jan. 21, 2008, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee, Hear-
ing regarding Data protection on the internet: Google-Doubleclick and other case studies, 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200801/20080117AT
T19091/20080117ATT19091EN.pdf [hereinafter European Parliament, Google-Doubleclick 
entire hearing program].
199 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 175. 
200 European Parliament, Google-Doubleclick entire hearing program, supra note 198. 
201 An IP address is a unique number that identifies each computer on the internet. An IP 
address can reveal the city and country a person is physically located in and which internet 
service provider a person is using. Posting of Saul Hansell to N.Y. Times Bits Blog, Europe:
Your I.P. Address Is Personal, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/22/europe-your-ip-
address-is-personal/ (Jan. 22, 2008, 15:31 EST). 
202 Aoife White, IP Addresses Are Personal Data, E.U. Regulator Says, WASH. POST, Jan.
22, 2008, at D1. 
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along with all other search engines and online providers, would have to 
comply with Data Directive before collecting data on web surfing habits.203
Google argues that IP addresses are not personally identifiable information 
because IP addresses only identify a computer and not the person using it.204
The Article 29 Working Party expects to release a report in April 2008 on 
the application of the Data Directive to search engine data retention and 
targeted advertising, resolving the issue over IP addresses.205 The report will 
refine a November 2006 resolution, passed at a conference of Data Protec-
tion Authorities, which briefly analyzed the privacy issues of search engines 
and behavioral advertising.206
E. Significance of European Union and Federal Trade Commission 
Differences
The EU applied a much higher level of scrutiny when reviewing the 
Google-DoubleClick merger. The EU Commission on Competition initiated 
a longer and more in-depth investigation than the FTC Bureau of Competi-
tion’s investigation,207 after early public attention.208 Google knew that the 
EU Commission on Competition investigation would be more in-depth than 
the FTC Bureau of Competition’s investigation, and it therefore made con-
cessions early in the investigation.209 Although the EU Commission on 
Competition approved the merger under EU anti-trust law,210 it stated that 
other EU bodies, such as the Article 29 Working Party would continue to 
203 See Comment of Peter Fleischer in response to posting of Saul Hansell to N.Y. Times 
Bits Blog, I.P. Address: Partially Personal Information, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008 
/02/24/ip-address-partially-personal-information/#comment-113195 (Feb. 25, 2008, 04:42 
EST). 
204 Posting of Alma Whitten to Google Public Policy Blog, Are IP addresses personal?,
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2008/02/are-ip-addresses-personal.html (Feb. 22,  
2008, 12:31 PST). 
205 See Press Release, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 64th meeting (Feb. 19, 
2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/news/docs/pr_18_19_02_08 
_en.pdf (“The WP continued its deliberations on a long-awaited working paper on search 
engines, with a view to finalising this work in the course of the next months.”). 
206 Data Protection and Freedom of Information Commissioner of the State of Berlin, Ger-
many, 28th International Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners’ Conference, Resolu-
tion on Privacy Protection and Search Engines (Nov. 3, 2006), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/news/docs/pr_google_annex_16_05_07_en.pdf. 
207 See Press Release, European Commission, supra note 191. 
208 See Letter from Dr. Thilo Weichert, supra note 185. 
209 See Victoria Shannon, Europe Delays Google Deal for DoubleClick, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
14, 2007, at C7 (stating that Google would “keep certain DoubleClick business practices 
unchanged”). 
210 Press Release, European Commission on Competition, supra note 194. 
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review Google’s privacy practices.211 The FTC Bureau of Competition’s 
majority ruling on the Google-DoubleClick merger, however, ignored all 
privacy concerns raised by various parties and failed to ensure that the FTC 
Bureau of Consumer Protection would continue to closely watch Google’s 
practices that impact privacy.212
V. SAFE HARBOR ENFORCEMENT LIMITATIONS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
As previously discussed, the Data Directive relies entirely on gov-
ernment enforcement mechanisms, whereas the Safe Harbor has a multiple 
“layer” approach, incorporating primarily private-sector enforcement with 
governmental action as a means of last resort.213 The Safe Harbor’s 
“layered” approach seems, on its face, to give more protection. This section 
seeks to counter this impression by showing that a multiple “layer” ap-
proach is both less efficient and counter to the objective of protecting priva-
cy.  
A.  Initial Registration Oversight by the U.S. Department of Commerce 
1.  Safe Harbor Registration Processing Limitations 
a.  Problem  
As previously discussed, EU member states and the DOC use vastly 
different pre-operation methods of enforcement.214 Some EU member states 
take a pro-active approach to enforcement. For example, France’s Data Pro-
tection Authority limits all data operations of a company or organization 
until it gives explicit approval that all of the Data Directive’s requirements 
are met.215 The U.S. pre-operation enforcement arm for the Safe Harbor, the 
DOC,216 however, does not rigorously enforce Safe Harbor registrations. A 
leading privacy treatise states that the DOC role is only to approve applica-
tions217 without any scrutiny.218 Similarly, a 2004 EU commission found 
211 Europe Clears Google DoubleClick Bid, supra note 195 (“Regulators said their decision 
was based exclusively on the economic aspects of the deal and it had no bearing on the com-
panies’ obligations under E.U. personal privacy protection rules or how personal data is 
processed. European privacy regulators are now examining if the data protection policies of 
search engines comply with existing E.U. law.”). 
212 Press Release, Marc Rotenberg, supra note 181. 
213 See supra Part III.C.2.a. 
214 See supra Part III.C. 
215 WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-14. 
216 See supra Part III.B.1. 
217 Safe Harbor Certification Information, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, http://www.export
.gov/safeharbor/SH_Cert_Info.asp (lists the requisite information to fill-out the online certi-
fication form). 
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that the DOC failed to properly oversee Safe Harbor registrations because a 
“substantial minority” of Companies the DOC certified for the Safe Harbor 
did not have “visible” privacy policies.219 The DOC rejected these criticisms 
and has stated that it tests the online privacy policies of Companies “to the 
greatest extent possible.”220 The Department admits, though, that when a 
Company’s privacy policy is not readily available online it merely “con-
firm[s] with the contact point that the policy is available upon request.”221
The DOC insists that its review is so rigorous that it eventually rejects ap-
proximately fifty-percent of all initial Safe Harbor applications due to defi-
ciencies in at least one area.222 The rejection figure, however, may be due to 
very mundane deficiencies, such as failure include a Company officer’s fax 
number.223
The Safe Harbor’s failure to include any formal process for applica-
tion review is surprising. The Safe Harbor, therefore, does not even require 
the U.S. DOC to verify the existence of a Company’s privacy policies. This 
is of great concern because it means that the FTC does not have the power 
to punish websites that fail to publish required privacy statements.224 Courts 
have interpreted that a failure to make a statement is not within the FTC 
Act’s bar on deceptive practices.225
b.  Proposed Solution  
If the DOC’s review process is as rigorous as it claims to be, then it 
should use methods that are more transparent to EU Citizens—the people 
the Safe Harbor purports to protect. This should involve a publicly disclosed 
Safe Harbor acceptance review procedure that details, at a minimum, how 
privacy policies are verified. Currently, if a Company’s privacy policy is not 
readily available online, the DOC merely “confirm[s] with the contact point 
that the policy is available upon request.”226 The DOC should demand that 
218 WOLF, supra note 19, at 14-28 (“[The] safe harbor’s [has] a self-certification system 
without mandatory independent verification of what a business actually does”). 
219 See EU Safe Harbor Criticism, supra note 8, at 6–7. 
220 U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework PowerPoint, supra note 59, notes accompanying slide 
10.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 See Safe Harbor Certification Information, supra note 53 (listing the requisite informa-
tion to fill-out the online certification form). 
224 Pedersen, supra note 9, at 10. 
225 See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex III (“[T]he Federal Trade Commission . . . [can 
only] take action against those who fail to protect the privacy of personal information in 
accordance with their representations and/or commitments.”) (emphasis added). 
226 U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework PowerPoint, supra note 59, notes accompanying slide 
10.
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any Company’s privacy policy be readily available online and require a 
Company to demonstrate how it would handle a privacy complaint. 
c.  Difficulties with Proposed Solution 
The first roadblock to a more formal Safe Harbor review process 
may be the Safe Harbor itself. Companies will probably be unwilling to 
open up their files for verification of compliance by a government body 
without a clear legal requirement to do so, which the Safe Harbor lacks. 
This problem is a running theme in this Note’s proposed solutions. Even if 
the DOC made a goodwill gesture and invoked more procedures to fulfill 
the spirit of the Data Directive—and even if those changes were made at the 
request of EU member states and their Data Protection Authorities—the 
DOC it has no legal basis to make a change. All that is legally required is 
outlined in the Safe Harbor. 
The only way for EU member states to create a legal requirement 
for change is for the EU to directly reverse itself and find that the current 
Safe Harbor protections are not adequate. Only then could EU member 
states force U.S. agencies back to the negotiating table to enact greater en-
forcement protections. Nevertheless, an EU reversal regarding the adequacy 
of the Safe Harbor protections would be a significant revocation that would 
likely harm any later negotiations.  
The second roadblock to a more formal Safe Harbor review process 
is the budget for DOC. The DOC devotes only twenty minutes to review 
each online Safe Harbor application and forty minutes for each paper appli-
cation.227 Additionally, the DOC will only commit 550 hours annually to the 
Safe Harbor.228 The DOC has only allotted itself $190,250 annually for the 
entire Safe Harbor program.229
2.  Few Safe Harbor registrants 
a.           Problem  
The DOC must also overcome the lack of Safe Harbor registrants. 
Initially, the DOC estimated 1,500 Companies would register annually;230
however, after more than seven years, the Safe Harbor program currently 
has only 1,300 Companies, of which approximately one-fifth have failed to 
227 Information for Certification Under FAQ 6 of the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, 65 
Fed. Reg. 66,690 (proposed Nov. 7, 2000). 
228 Id.
229 Id. The Federal Register has a typo that indicates the dollar amount as “$19,0250,” 
which should read “$190,250.” 
230 Id.
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complete the required annual re-certification.231 These “numbers are insigni-
ficant and a poor return for the effort that was put into establishing the Safe 
Harbor framework.”232 A 2004 EU commission on the Safe Harbor similar-
ly found that the “number of registered [Safe Harbor] organisations is lower 
than initially anticipated and this is a cause of disappointment.”233 In March 
2005, the DOC attempted to resolve the lack of registrants by lowering the 
Safe Harbor registration fee from between $150–500 annually, based on 
annual revenue, to only $50 across the board.234 Such a small cost, however, 
was likely not a barrier for any multi-million or multi-billion dollar Compa-
ny. 
b.  Proposed solution  
The DOC should eliminate all Safe Harbor registration fees and fur-
ther educate Companies that registering for the Safe Harbor can limit a 
Company’s liability. The DOC is heading in the right direction and recently 
completed a two-day information session235 for Companies on the various 
methods of complying with the Data Directive, including the Safe Har-
bor.236 Unfortunately, the event was limited to only 150 attendees237 and 
most of the presentations on the Safe Harbor only described the basic regis-
tration requirements and failed to highlight the benefits of the Safe Har-
bor.238 One of the presenters at the conference—Ms. Joan Antokol, a partner 
at the Baker & Daniels law firm—specifically highlighted where the DOC 
should focus its efforts in the future.239 Ms. Antokol stated that most com-
panies do not register for the Safe Harbor because there is: (1) a lack of per-
ceived need; (2) hesitation by Company in-house counsel; (3) a lack of 
231 The list is available online. Safe Harbor List, supra note 51.  
232 Pedersen, supra note 9, at 1. 
233 EU Safe Harbor Criticism, supra note 8, at 5. 
234 See Letter from Data Protection Panel on Payment of the Annual Fee, U.S. Dept. Com-
merce (Mar. 10, 2005), http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/secureida/safeharbor/library?l=/ 
public_folder&vm=detailed&sb=Title (Click on “Payment of Annual Fee” for full text). 
235 Conference on Cross Border Data Flows, Data Protection, and Privacy, Agenda, 
http://safeharbor.govtools.us/agenda.aspx (last visited Oct 28, 2008). 
236 The conference was announced in the Federal Register. Meeting Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 
41,290 (July 27, 2007). 
237 Id.
238 See, e.g., Damon C. Greer, Safe Harbor Program, The U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Frame-
work (Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.safeharbor.govtools.us/documents/1A_DOC_Greer.ppt; 
Giovanni Butarelli, Secretary General, The European Union’s Data Protection Framework 12 
Years Later (Oct. 15–16, 2007), http://www.safeharbor.govtools.us/documents/1B_IT%20 
Garante_Butarelli1.ppt. 
239 See Joan Antokol, Safe Harbor Certification: The Company Perspective Presentation 
(2007), available at http://www.safeharbor.govtools.us/documents/1C_B&D_Antokol.pdf.
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awareness about where to begin; and (4) little or no awareness of the bene-
fits of the program.240
B.  The Enforcement Principle 
There are several problems with the Enforcement Principle’s self-
regulatory approach. This section discusses the problems with the Enforce-
ment Principle’s “independent recourse mechanism” and verification re-
quirements. This section concludes that the only viable solution is to elimi-
nate the self-regulatory Enforcement Principle requirements because priva-
cy self-regulation is counter to the goal of protecting privacy. 
1.  Criticisms of the Enforcement Principle’s independent recourse 
mechanism and the Guarantee to Remedy requirements 
a.  Lack of statutory commands 
The Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse mechanism” 
requirement241 allows for an arbitrary level of sanctions because it lacks any 
traditional statutory language commands. Although the Safe Harbor seems 
to specify a strict “base” level of remedy, the language of the Safe Harbor is 
largely suggestive and not obligatory. For example, the Safe Harbor En-
forcement Principle states that an “independent recourse mechanism” 
“should” reverse or correct the effects of non-compliance “in so far as feas-
ible,” and then, “where appropriate, th[e] processing of the personal data of 
the individual who has brought the complaint will cease.”242 The Safe Har-
bor section on “independent recourse mechanisms” goes on to suggest what 
other sanctions a recourse body “could” include.243
Similar to the Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse me-
chanism,” the Enforcement Principle’s guarantee to remedy requirement244
has only one line with traditional statutory language that includes words 
such as “must” or “shall.” The Enforcement Principle’s guarantee to remedy 
requirement states that any “independent recourse mechanism” “must” noti-
fy both the DOC and the governmental body with applicable jurisdiction if a 
Company fails to comply with the procedures and remedies demanded by 
the “independent recourse mechanism.”245 The “must” commandment, how-
ever, may never become an issue because an “independent recourse me-
chanism” is not required to impose any level of sanction to begin with. 
240 Id.
241 See supra Part III.B.3.a. 
242 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II (emphasis added). 
243 Id. (emphasis added). 
244 See supra Part III.B.3.c. 
245 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II (emphasis added). 
2009] EU-U.S. DATA PRIVACY SAFE HARBOR 225
Therefore, if an “independent recourse mechanism” does not sanction a 
Company, then an “independent recourse mechanism” never “must” refer 
the company to any U.S. regulatory agency for non-compliance. The En-
forcement Principle, therefore, gives the “independent recourse mechanism” 
infinite discretion, and hence the Enforcement Principle’s guarantee to re-
medy is ineffective. Thus, Companies have an incentive to search for an 
“independent recourse mechanism” that, in the event of a violation, would 
give the lightest sanctions or no sanctions at all. 
b.  Types of Independent Recourse Mechanisms 
As discussed, the Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse 
mechanism” requirement may be fulfilled in one of four ways.246 The fol-
lowing criticisms address the methods of fulfilling the “independent re-
course mechanism” requirement. 
i.  Private-sector privacy programs 
First, the Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse mechan-
ism” requirement allows Companies to use private-sector privacy pro-
grams.247 Private-sector privacy programs, such as TRUSTe248 and BBBOn-
line,249 are organizations that assist Companies create and implement priva-
cy policies. Private-sector privacy programs can be ineffective, though, be-
cause the Safe Harbor, as just discussed, has no requisite level of sanc-
tions.250 Companies are free to shop around for private-sector privacy pro-
grams that have a history of lenient enforcement. For example, BBBOnline 
has forty-five Companies registered with its Safe Harbor compliance pro-
gram.251 The BBBOnline program has large Company participants with data 
that may be particularly sensitive, such as Careerbuilder.com, which has 
data on work histories and resumes, and Amazon.com, which has data on 
purchase histories and credit card payments.252 The BBBOnline has no set 
rules for sanctions.253 If a Company were to either fail to publish its privacy 
policy or fail to fulfill its privacy policy, then under the BBBOnline pro-
gram, a Company has the option of “propos[ing] alternative corrective ac-
246 See supra Part III.B.3.a. 
247 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II. 
248 TRUSTe.com, http://www.truste.com/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2008). 
249 BBBOnline, http://www.bbb.org/online/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2008). 
250 See supra Part V.B.1.a. 
251 BBBOnline, European Union/US Safe Harbor Dispute Resolution Participants, 
http://www.bbbonline.org/privacy/eu-participants.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2008). 
252 See id.
253 BBBONLINE, SAFE HARBOR PRIVACY DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE, § 3.3.1 (Apr. 9, 
2003), http://www.bbbonline.org/privacy/DataPrivacyDRRules.pdf. 
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tion with regard to its privacy policies or practices to remedy the noncom-
pliance.”254 Additionally, the entire process can take up to six months before 
BBBOnline reports a violation to a government enforcement agency.255
In 2004, an EU commission on the Safe Harbor raised similar con-
cerns about private-sector privacy programs serving as a Company’s “inde-
pendent recourse mechanism.” The EU commission on the Safe Harbor 
found that private-sector privacy programs “do not seem to foresee ways to 
remedy situations of failure to abide by the Principles.”256
ii.  Vague independent recourse mechanisms 
Second, the Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse me-
chanism” requirement allows Companies to employ other private-sector 
“independent recourse mechanisms” so long as the “independent recourse 
mechanisms” “meet the requirements of the Enforcement Principle and the 
FAQs.”257 A new trend is developing in this area, whereby recent Safe Har-
bor applications of various Companies list arbitration associations as their 
chosen “independent recourse mechanism.” In a random sampling of fifty of 
the Safe Harbor Companies, four large Companies—Hard Rock Cafe Inter-
national, ConAgra Foods, Eastman Kodak Company, and Electronic Arts—
list arbitration associations as the Company’s “independent recourse me-
chanism.”258 This is extremely disturbing because arbitrators in the U.S. are 
under no requirement to follow the letter of the law.259 The fact that arbitra-
tors do not have to rule after considering and applying the law bars arbitra-
254 Id.
255 See id. This is a maximum, but perfectly acceptable both by the Safe Harbor Agreement 
and the BBBOnline procedure terms. This total was calculated by adding the time a company 
has to respond to a complaint (§ 3.2.2, 15 business days), the complainant reply process (§ 
3.2.4, 10 business days), the response to a reply process (§ 3.2.5, 10 business days), the re-
quest for additional information process (§ 3.2.6, 10 business days), the initial decision 
process (§ 3.3, 20 business days), a request for appeal (§ 4.2.1, 15 business days), a response 
to the appeal (§ 4.2.4, 10 business days), an appeal decision (§ 4.7.1, 20 business days), a 
respondent’s statement to add to the appeal decision (§ 4.7.2, 10 business days), the verifica-
tion of performance process (§ 5, 30 days), and a ten-day warning period (§ 1.12). Id.
256 EU Safe Harbor Criticism, supra note 8, at 11. 
257 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II. 
258 See Safe Harbor List, supra note 51. 
259 Arbitrations over Safe Harbor disagreements would necessarily be international in 
scope. International law is solely under the jurisdiction of the U.S. federal government, and 
therefore any arbitration stemming from a Safe Harbor disagreement would fall under the 
Federal Arbitration Act. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 
1-4 (1994)). Arbitrators under the Federal Arbitration Act are not required to rule based on 
any law. 3 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 37.4.1, at 37:10 (1999) 
(stating that arbitrators have no obligation under the Federal Arbitration Act “to make find-
ings of fact or conclusions of law, or otherwise to give reasons for their awards”). 
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tion associations as “independent recourse mechanisms” because they are 
not required to adhere to the “Enforcement Principle and the FAQs.”260
In addition, arbitration associations have a strong economic incen-
tive to rule in favor of Companies that provide their work. For example, Mr. 
Richard Neely, a retired West Virginia Supreme Court chief justice, said 
that arbitration associations ask for
substantial costs related to the arbitration itself. . . . In one case that I han-
dled, the fees alone amounted to $450. Furthermore, the arbitration com-
pany sends the arbitrator a judgment form already filled out so that all the 
arbitrator need do is check the appropriate box. . . . In my case I did not 
award the [defendant company] the litigation-related fees. . . . I never got 
another case!261
Finally, the Safe Harbor explicitly requires any “independent re-
course mechanism” be “readily available, and affordable” to a potential 
complainant.262 Arbitration fees can be costly,263 and neither Hard Rock 
Cafe International, ConAgra Foods, Eastman Kodak Company, nor Elec-
tronic Arts state in their Safe Harbor registrations that they will pay the arbi-
tration fees on behalf of a complainant.264 Therefore, even if arbitration as-
sociations were an acceptable “independent recourse mechanism,” Compa-
nies still would have to pay the vast majority of arbitration fees to make 
complaints “affordable” to an EU Citizen.265
A 2004 EU commission on the Safe Harbor raised similar concerns 
about arbitration associations serving as a Company’s “independent re-
course mechanism.” The 2004 EU commission on the Safe Harbor stated 
that arbitration associations “lack transparency insofar as they operate with-
out properly informing individuals as to how the dispute resolution proce-
dure works to file a complaint for alleged failure to abide by the Prin-
ciples.”266
iii. Nonexistent independent recourse mechanisms
Third, the Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse mechan-
ism” requirement allows Companies to use “compliance with legal or regu-
260 See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II. 
261 Richard Neely, Arbitration and the Godless Bloodsuckers, THE WEST VIRGINIA 
LAWYER, Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 12, 12., available at http://www.wvbar.org/barinfo/lawyerr/2 
006/septoct2006.pdf. 
262 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex I. 
263 See Neely, supra note 261, at 12. 
264 Safe Harbor List, supra note 51. 
265 See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II. 
266 EU Safe Harbor Criticism, supra note 8, at 11. 
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latory supervisory authorities that provide for handling of individual com-
plaints and dispute resolution” as an acceptable “independent recourse me-
chanism” option.267 On its face, the Safe Harbor seems to indicate that 
Companies can hire anyone to listen to and resolve EU Citizen complaints. 
As previously discussed,268 it appears that some Companies have interpreted 
this language to indicate that an “independent recourse mechanism” can 
include a Company’s own internal complaint process.269 At the outset, to 
allow a Company’s “independent recourse mechanism” to be the Company
itself is a self-contradiction. It is hard to imagine a Company that would 
discuss a possible Safe Harbor violation directly with its customer and then 
refer the matter to a government enforcement body after a failure to reach a 
resolution. Companies that list their own internal resolution measures as 
their “independent recourse mechanism” fail to understand the Safe Har-
bor’s intent. The Safe Harbor specifically states that EU Citizens are first 
“encouraged to raise any complaints they may have with the relevant organ-
ization before proceeding to independent recourse mechanisms.”270 This 
language shows that the meaning of “independent” clearly excludes the very 
Company being complained about. Yet the Safe Harbor itself lacks guid-
ance on what it means to be “independent.” The Safe Harbor states only that 
“[w]hether a recourse mechanism is independent is a factual question that 
can be demonstrated in a number of ways, for example, by transparent com-
position and financing or a proven track record.”271
iv.  Conclusion on the types of independent recourse mechanisms 
Altogether, the statutory language of the Safe Harbor Enforcement 
Principle’s “independent recourse mechanism” “layer” of protection is inef-
fective at ensuring compliance. Many Companies seem content with ignor-
ing the clear intention of the Safe Harbor, and the DOC appears similarly 
content to allow the Safe Harbor registration of such Companies. “Indepen-
dent recourse mechanism” sanctions are arbitrary and leave no promise of 
actual remedy for complainants. The Safe Harbor Enforcement Principle 
seems to rely on self-regulation to the point of absurdity. 
267 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II. 
268 See supra Part III.B.3.a. 
269 See, e.g., Safe Harbor List, supra note 51. (listing Adaptec, Inc.’s “independent recourse 
mechanism” as: “Consumer or Adaptec employee complaints will generally be escalated 
internally to the Adaptec corporate legal department which will consult with management on 
appropriate response or action depending on the facts at issue.”). Only after going through 
Adaptec’s process unsuccessfully will it refer the matter to an EU Data Protection Authority.  
270 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II. 
271 Id.
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2.  Criticisms of the Enforcement Principle’s Verification Requirement 
As explained earlier,272 a Company may choose to “self-verify” that 
its stated privacy practices are actually implemented.273 Given the choice 
between annual outside compliance reviews where the Safe Harbor requires 
“without limitation auditing, random reviews, [and] use of ‘decoys,’ ”274
and the choice of “self-verification,” it is not surprising that very few Com-
panies choose to use outside compliance reviews to fulfill the verification 
requirement of the Enforcement Principle.275 Although a Company imple-
menting “self-verification” is required to “retain their records on the imple-
mentation of their safe harbor privacy practices and make them available 
upon request in the context of an investigation,”276 there is no requirement 
for an “independent recourse mechanism” to employ additional sanctions if 
a Company falsely “self-verifies.” It is conceivable, and fully within the 
Safe Harbor guidelines, that a Company that acts willfully and in bad faith 
will receive the same or lesser sanction than another Company that has at-
tempted to adhere to the Safe Harbor requirements, but has nonetheless 
committed a unintentional violation. Therefore, allowing “self-verification” 
to fulfill the verification requirement of the Enforcement Principle seems to 
dissuade proper implementation.  
3.  Worst-case scenario 
Under the current Enforcement Principle regime, a frugal and risk-
avoiding Company may take the following measures. A Company could fail 
to publish a privacy policy initially, and hope the DOC would accept its 
Safe Harbor registration, thereby evading FTC jurisdiction. Then a Compa-
ny could choose an arbitration association that is known for ruling in favor 
of Companies as its method of “independent recourse mechanism,” thereby 
forcing a costly burden on an EU Citizen to initiate an action. Finally, the 
Company could “self-verify” that it is complying with its unpublished pri-
vacy practices. Taken one at a time, these possibilities seem troubling; taken 
together, they add up to a virtual guarantee that EU Citizen’s complaints 
will be ignored, with no Safe Harbor repercussions. 
272 See supra Part III.B.3.b. 
273 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II. 
274 Id.
275 See WOLF, supra note 19, 14–28. 
276 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II. 
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4.  Conclusion on the effectiveness of the Enforcement Principle 
a.  Unintended consequences of the Enforcement Principle 
Data breaches provide an example of the unintended consequences 
of the Safe Harbor’s Enforcement Principle. Identity theft in the U.S. is at 
an all time high, with a recent survey showing that 8.3 million American 
adults, or 3.7 percent of all American adults, were victims of identity theft 
in 2005.277 Thirty-two percent of the fraud complaints the FTC received in 
2007 were in regards to identity theft.278 Although it is impossible to tell 
what proportion of identity thefts are the result of data breaches at the com-
pany level, Companies likely store data from EU Citizens at the same loca-
tions—with the same level of security—as the Company’s U.S. customers. 
Statistics are not available for the entire EU, but identity theft in the United 
Kingdom is on the rise.279 In 2006, approximately 100,000 United Kingdom 
citizens had their identity stolen annually, costing the United Kingdom 
economy £1.7 billion annually.280
Some U.S. states require companies to notify customers that may be 
affected by a data-breach, but U.S. state laws vary widely.281 In contrast, 
under the Safe Harbor, a Company has no explicit requirement to notify EU 
Citizens affected by a data-breach. Therefore, an EU Citizen may be able to 
detect the end result of a data-breach in the form of a stolen identity, but an 
EU Citizen would be unable to pinpoint which Company was the source of 
infraction. Without knowing which Company is responsible, an EU Citizen 
cannot seek the assistance of any Company’s “independent recourse me-
chanism.” Any EU Citizen’s effort to find which Company was the source 
of the privacy violation would likely be fruitless. In this situation, the Safe 
Harbor Enforcement Principle “layer” only serves to delay or prevent reso-
lution. In contrast, EU Citizens whose identities are stolen from a United 
Kingdom company are under the full protection of the Data Directive that 
277 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Releases Survey of Identity Theft in the U.S. 
Study Shows 8.3 Million Victims in 2005 (Nov. 27, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/1 
1/idtheft.shtm. See also FED. TRADE COMM’N, 2006 IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT (2007), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/11/SynovateFinalReportIDTheft2006.pdf. 
278 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Releases List of Top Consumer Fraud Com-
plaints in 2007 (Feb. 13, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/02/fraud.shtm. 
279 See FRAUD PREVENTION EXPERT GROUP, REPORT ON IDENTITY THEFT/FRAUD (Oct. 22, 
2007), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fpeg/docs/id-theft-report_en.pdf. 
280 Id. at 8. 
281 Currently thirty-eight states have data-breach notifications laws, but only a handful of 
those states provide a private right-of-action. See Scott Berinato, Data Breach Notification 
Laws, State By State, CSO Disclosure Series, Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.csoonline.com/read 
/020108/ammap/ammap.html. See also Posting of Tanya Forsheit to Privacy Law Blog, 
Breach Law Data, http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2007/08/articles/security-breach-
notification-l/breach-law-data/ (Aug. 3, 2007). 
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provides immediate assistance through the Data Directive’s Data Protection 
Authorities.282
b.  Fixing the Enforcement Principle 
The Safe Harbor Enforcement Principle should be eliminated and 
replaced with an enforcement mechanism similar to the Data Directive.283
Eliminating the current Safe Harbor Enforcement Principle would enable an 
independent government agency with meaningful investigatory powers to 
act sua sponte to police privacy violations, such as data thefts, as soon as an 
EU Citizen discovers them. This solution, however, would require giving 
additional powers to a consumer-protection agency such as the FTC. The 
remaining sections of Part V address how to implement a more proactive 
FTC, with respect to the Safe Harbor, to properly guard against privacy 
violations. 
Some may object, arguing that there is a need for private sector re-
course remains in order to resolve simple complaints. It is admittedly help-
ful to have resolution procedures run by non-governmental agencies, to re-
solve mundane complaints and dismiss unsubstantiated complaints, howev-
er, mundane and unsubstantiated complaints can be settled at the Company 
level. It is important to stress that having only one official enforcement 
“layer” in the form of a U.S. government agency does not preclude an EU 
Citizen from resolving issues directly with a Company. Effective privacy 
enforcement requires a U.S. agency be available to EU Citizens at all times. 
This will ensure that EU Citizens’ privacy is monitored on a macro level 
and that EU Citizens’ can immediately turn to a U.S. agency to address 
complex data privacy issues such as data breaches. 
C. Government Agency Enforcement through the Federal Trade Com-
mission
1.  The Federal Trade Commission’s limited jurisdiction within the 
United States 
FTC’s power is limited in scope by statute.284 The FTC does not 
have the authority to regulate banks, saving and loans, credit unions, tele-
communications, interstate transportation, common carriers, or air carri-
ers.285 As discussed earlier, the only other governmental agency that has 
committed to enforcing the Safe Harbor is the Department of Transporta-
tion, which regulates interstate transportation, common carriers, and air 
282 See infra Part V.C.2.a. (completing the analysis of the data breach example). 
283 See supra Part III.C.1. (discussing the Data Directive’s enforcement mechanisms). 
284 See 15 U.S.C §§ 41–58 (2006).
285 Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex VII. See also 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).  
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carriers.286 Banking and telecommunication Companies cannot register for 
the Safe Harbor unless and until the respective governing bodies commit to 
enforcement.287 The Federal Communications Commission—regulating the 
telecommunications industry—and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency—regulating the banking industry—have simply refused to commit 
themselves to Safe Harbor enforcement.288 Banking and telecommunication 
Companies, therefore, must rely on one of the two alternative methods for 
complying with the Data Directive: Binding Corporate Rules or Pre-
Approved contracts.289 Because Companies do not uniformly comply with 
the Data Directive under the Safe Harbor, EU Citizens may be confused as 
to what recourse they have for privacy concerns and violations. Further, EU 
Citizens may be confused which, if any, regulatory body to contact for as-
sistance. 
Additionally, the FTC does not have authority to regulate non-profit 
Companies.290 The FTC Act states that the FTC can regulate organizations 
“affecting commerce.”291 Commerce is a legal term of art that has been in-
terpreted to mean a great number of things. American courts have given the 
term “commerce” a very broad definition, for the purposes of interpreting 
U.S. Congressional authority to regulate under the commerce clause of the 
U.S. Constitution’s article 1, section 8.292 In the case of the FTC, however, 
U.S. courts have interpreted the term commerce narrowly, allowing the FTC 
to regulate only traditional businesses—purveyors of goods and services.293
286 See supra Part III.C.2.b. 
287 See Export.gov, Safe Harbor Workbook, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH_wo 
rkbook.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2008). 
288 See id. See also Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex VII. 
289 See supra Part III.A. 
290 See Letter from Robert Pitofsky to John Mogg, Director, DG XV (July 14, 2000), 
http://www.export.gov/static/SH_FTC_Letter.pdf. See also Export.gov, Safe Harbor En-
forcement Overview, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH_enforcement_overview.asp (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2008). 
291 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
292 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294 (1964); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
293 See Letter from Robert Pitofsky to John Mogg, Director, DG XV, supra note 290. See
also Export.gov, supra note 290. 
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2.  The Federal Trade Commission’s limited international jurisdiction 
a.  Problem  
Although the FTC Act allows the FTC to regulate “commerce . . . 
with foreign nations,”294 U.S. court interpretations of the FTC Act have held 
that the FTC does not have power to pursue “unfair deceptive acts or prac-
tices”295 affecting only foreigners. For example, in Nieman v. DryClean 
U.S.A. Franchise Company, the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
stated that “the FTC Act does not clearly indicate that Congress intended 
the [FTC] Act to apply extraterritorially.”296 Therefore, the FTC’s authority 
over foreign “unfair deceptive acts or practices”297 only extends when there 
is a domestic impact.298 Failure to understand that the FTC lacks jurisdiction 
to pursue violations affecting only foreigners was blatant oversight by the 
EU Data Protection Authorities that negotiated the Safe Harbor. 
b.  Proposed solution  
The Safe Harbor perhaps could rely on individual U.S. states’ attor-
ney generals to be a substitute for the FTC’s current inability to pursue for-
eign “unfair deceptive acts or practices” because, as previously discussed, 
U.S. states have the power to regulate some aspects of privacy law.299 U.S. 
states, however, are pre-empted from regulating issues of international 
scope.300
The only remaining solution, therefore, is to increase the scope of 
the FTC’s authority to pursue foreign “unfair deceptive acts or practices.” 
Thankfully, the FTC can easily increase the scope of its power on its own. 
294 15 U.S.C. § 44 (2006). 
295 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 
296 Nieman v. DryClean U.S.A. Franchise Company, Inc., 178 F.3d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir. 
1999).
297 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 
298 See Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31, 34–35 (7th Cir. 1944) (holding that the FTC has juris-
diction to regulate an entity’s conduct with respect to foreign customers based on the effect 
on domestic competition). 
299 See supra Part V.B.4.a (discussing U.S. state data breach notification laws). 
300 For example, Massachusetts vs. Environmental Protection Agency declared that “when 
a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives. . . . [States] cannot 
negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in some circumstances the exercise of 
[a State’s] police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-
empted.” Mass. vs. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007). See also Crosby v. National Foreign 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that Congress preempted a Massachusetts law 
that banned companies from doing business in Burma because, even though Congress was 
silent on preemption, the state law was an obstacle to implied objectives of federal Burma 
sanctions).
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Under U.S. administrative law, the FTC is free to interpret its own originat-
ing statute, the FTC Act,301 so long as the originating statute was not already 
unambiguous on the matter.302 Although the FTC Act already, unambi-
guously, appears to allow the FTC to regulate “commerce . . . with foreign 
nations,”303 U.S. courts have limited this language.304 Nevertheless, the FTC 
could simply promulgate a rule305 interpreting its own originating statute, 
the FTC Act, and allow itself to pursue foreign “unfair deceptive acts or 
practices” despite the prior court rulings.306 The FTC’s new interpretation, 
though contrary to the previous court rulings, takes precedent.307
3.  The Federal Trade Commission’s limited investigatory powers  
a.  Problem  
Under normal circumstances, the FTC Act allows the FTC to pursue 
outside investigation requests from five groups: (1) the U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral;308 (2) the U.S. President;309 (3) the U.S. Congress;310 (4) U.S. courts;311
and (5) the general public.312 Additionally, the FTC can initiate investiga-
tions on its own.313 The FTC Act appears to give the FTC broad investigato-
ry powers; however, under the Safe Harbor, the FTC limited its own inves-
301 15 U.S.C §§ 41–58 (2006). 
302 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984) (holding that if Congress has not directly spoken on an issue of an administrative 
agency’s power, then courts should defer to an agency’s construction of their own originating 
statute so long as such construction is reasonable). 
303 15 U.S.C. § 44. 
304 See, e.g., Nieman v. DryClean U.S.A. Franchise Co., 178 F.3d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir. 
1999) (stating that “the FTC Act does not clearly indicate that Congress intended the [FTC] 
Act to apply extraterritorially”). 
305 Rulemaking is procedure under administrative law where a U.S. governmental agency 
creates a rule that has the force of law after a notice and comment period. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
Further discussion on the requirements of rulemaking and administrative law are beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
306 See Nieman, 178 F.3d at 1130. 
307 See National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 
545 U.S. 967 (2005) (holding that prior judicial construction of an agency’s originating sta-
tute is only given force if the prior decision holds that statutory construction requires a cer-
tain construction based on unambiguous terms of the statute, leaving no room for agency 
discretion).
308 FTC Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2008). 
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 FTC Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 2.2 (2008). 
313 15 U.S.C. § 46(a). 
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tigatory power.314 One of the Safe Harbor documents is a letter written by 
the FTC in response to the European Commission’s concerns about en-
forcement.315 The FTC stated that it would “give priority to referrals of 
non-compliance with safe harbor principles.”316 “Referral” is a critical word 
that refers to the Safe Harbor Enforcement Principle’s guarantee to remedy 
requirement, which states that any “independent recourse mechanism” must 
notify both the DOC and the governmental body with applicable jurisdic-
tion—usually the FTC—if a Company fails to comply with the procedures 
and remedies demanded by the “independent recourse mechanism.”317
Therefore, under the Safe Harbor, the FTC may only receive investigation 
requests from “independent recourse mechanisms.” Additionally, even if the 
FTC receives an investigation request from an “independent recourse me-
chanism,” the Safe Harbor fails to require the FTC to act; instead, the Safe 
Harbor only states that the FTC will “give priority” to “independent re-
course mechanism” investigation requests.318 An EU Citizen, therefore, has 
no recourse if the FTC does not investigate a Company—despite an investi-
gation request from the Company’s “independent recourse mechanism.” An 
EU Citizen could only submit a hard-to-locate complaint319 to his or her 
country’s Data Protection Authority and hope that the Data Protection Au-
thority will convince the FTC to reconsider and take action on the “inde-
pendent recourse mechanism” investigation request.  
Some Companies have stated that they have chosen not to join the 
Safe Harbor because of the very real possibility that, even if a matter were 
referred to the FTC by an “independent recourse mechanism,” the FTC 
could take no action. British Petroleum’s group privacy and data protection 
manager state that British Petroleum did not join the Safe Harbor because it 
“lacked the desired teeth to physically bind BP’s affiliates to the Safe Har-
bor principles.”320 Even if the FTC were to follow up on an investigation 
request from an “independent recourse mechanism,” both the EU Citizen 
whose privacy is at issue and any concerned third party, such as the Article 
314 See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex V. 
315 See Letter from Robert Pitofsky to John Mogg, Director, DG XV, supra note 290.
316 Id. (emphasis added). 
317 See Safe Harbor, supra note 6, annex II. 
318 Id. annex V. 
319 See Communication & Information Resource Centre Administrator (CIRCA) Date 
Protection Panel, Standard Complaint Form, http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/secureida/safe 
harbor/library?l=/public_folder/complaint_form&vm=detailed&sb=Title (last visited Aug. 
31, 2008). 
320 Pedersen, supra note 9, at 3. 
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29 Working Party, would have no standing on any investigation that the 
FTC conducts.321
In summation, EU Citizens that ordinarily rely on EU member state 
Data Protection Authorities to protect their privacy rights322 are forced to 
become their own police agents and report unresolved violations on their 
own.323 Continuing with the data breach example,324 EU Citizens seem par-
ticularly ill suited to detect data breaches occurring in the U.S., save for 
well-reported data thefts. The majority of data privacy concerns stem from 
one of two circumstances. The first situation is when there is a private sale 
of personal information—for example, to a marketing company willing to 
pay for personal home addresses—where both parties to the transaction 
would rarely be open about their actions. The second scenario is when a 
Company is “hacked” and personal information is stolen from it. Some 
Companies may want to keep quiet about the breach of security. In both of 
these scenarios, the FTC’s self-limitation on enforcing the Safe Harbor 
means that there is no centralized regulatory body that can remedy the data 
breach privacy violations in a uniform manner.  
b.  Proposed Solution  
The DOC and the Data Protection Authorities should amend the 
Safe Harbor to compel FTC oversight and allow for investigation requests 
directly from EU Citizens and third-party organizations. A 2004 EU com-
mission on the Safe Harbor similarly urged the FTC to “undertake sua
sponte investigations where questions exist regarding Safe Harbour com-
pliance.”325 The FTC already has procedures in place for accepting public 
complaints.326 Additionally, many third-party non-governmental organiza-
tions would voluntarily help the FTC enforce the Safe Harbor, such as the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center327 and the Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation.328 Finally, each EU member state’s Data Protection Authority has its 
321 PETER C. WARD, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 3–16 
(Law Journal Press, Release 39, 2007) (“[P]rivate third-party complainants [are excluded] as 
formal parties to Commission proceedings . . . ”). See also Rodgers v. FTC, 492 F.2d 228, 
229 (9th Cir. 1974). 
322 See supra Part III.C.1. 
323 See supra Part V.B.4.a (discussing how an EU Citizen would be unlikely to pinpoint the 
source of a stolen identity). 
324 Id. 
325 EU Safe Harbor Criticism, supra note 8, at 10. 
326 See Federal Trade Commission, FTC Consumer Complaint Form, https://rn.ftc.gov/pl 
s/dod/wsolcq$.startup?Z_ORG_CODE=PU01/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2008). 
327 See Electronic Privacy Information Center, http://www.epic.org/ (last visited Aug. 26, 
2008).
328 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2008). 
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own research abilities.329 The Data Protection Authorities would undoubted-
ly be willing to research potential violations of privacy on behalf of EU 
citizens and forward the information to the FTC. 
It would take a large bureaucracy to oversee hundreds of Compa-
ny’s privacy protection initiatives, and the FTC may not have the resources 
to devote to many investigations given the scope of data exchange between 
the EU and U.S.330 Additionally, the FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection’s 
Division of Enforcement and Privacy are probably more motivated to use 
their limited resources331 to enforce laws that have a direct impact on Amer-
icans. The FTC, however, would not have to use many resources, if it re-
ceived assistance from non-governmental organization and Data Protection 
Authority investigations and complaints. 
If the Safe Harbor were amended to force FTC oversight and allow 
for investigation requests directly from EU Citizens and non-governmental 
organizations, then the Enforcement Principle would need to be completely 
rewritten. The new Enforcement Principle should be flexible enough to take 
a common law approach similar to the Data Directive, but should also codi-
fy ongoing interpretations of the Safe Harbor. This would give Companies 
more concrete notice of actions that violate the Safe Harbor. 
As previously discussed, the Data Directive employs a common law 
adjudication approach to enforcement.332 A common law approach is useful 
for dealing with new situations and to adjudicating by analogy; however, 
the new Enforcement Principle should also inform Companies of the current 
state of the law. To accomplish this, the FTC should use its power to prom-
ulgate rules.333 Since 1962, the FTC has promulgated rules that define spe-
cific acts as unfair or deceptive.334 After the FTC promulgates a rule under  
§57a(a)(1)(B), any violation of that rule is considered a per se unfair or de-
ceptive act or practice under the FTC Act.335 Therefore, as the FTC adjudi-
cates new privacy cases, the FTC may promulgate new rules to reflect the 
329 See European Commission, National Data Protection Commissioners, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/nationalcomm/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 
26, 2008). 
330 In 2004, the U.S. and its six largest European trade partners shared approximately $400 
billion in trade. U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework PowerPoint, supra note 59, at slide 3. 
331 See WARD, supra note 321, at 2–3 (“As federal bureaucracies go, the Federal Trade 
Commission is small. Its annual budget is approximately $156 million and it has a total staff 
of approximately 1000.”). 
332 See supra Part III.C.1 (“Data Protection Authorities give prior privacy adjudications a 
res judicata effect when litigating new cases.”). 
333 See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a) (2006). For a brief discussion of these rules and rulemaking, see 
supra note 305. 
334 The FTC’s rulemaking authority was later upheld as constitutional. See Nat’l Petroleum 
Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). 
335 15 U.S.C. § 57a(d)(3). 
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new adjudications. Additionally, the FTC could pass annual or bi-annual 
rulemakings that implement new understandings of the Data Directive, as 
interpreted by the Article 29 Working Party resolutions and the Data Protec-
tion Authorities. The FTC rulemakings would save the FTC time and re-
sources in adjudicating new cases. 
Peter Fleischer, Google’s Chief Privacy Counsel, has complained 
that it is difficult to keep track of different countries’ privacy laws.336 Mr. 
Fleischer stated that “[t]o be effective, privacy laws need to go global. . . . 
[Privacy] standards must be strong and credible but above all, they must be 
clear and they must be workable.”337 FTC rulemakings would be a good 
step towards quelling Mr. Fleischer’s concerns by harmonizing EU and U.S. 
data protection law. 
4.  The Federal Trade Commission enforcement is prepared to regulate 
privacy violations  
The FTC has the experience necessary to regulate Companies that 
transfer EU Citizen data. The FTC could protect EU Citizens better in two 
circumstances. The DOC and the Data Protection Authorities could agree to 
amend the Safe Harbor to compel FTC oversight and allow for investigation 
requests directly from EU Citizens and non-governmental organizations.338
Alternatively, even if the Safe Harbor agreement is not amended, the FTC 
could increase investigations and enforcement under U.S. law against Com-
panies that are members of the Safe Harbor. Companies that violate U.S. 
privacy law are likely the same Companies, which would also be abusing 
the Safe Harbor principles.
In the past, the FTC has vacillated on its role to regulate consumer 
privacy violations. In 1999, the FTC officially supported Company self-
regulation for issues of privacy.339 In 2000, however, after completing a 
survey on website privacy policies, the FTC recommended legislation to 
protect privacy.340 Despite the FTC’s change of heart, when George W. 
336 See Posting of Peter Fleischer to Peter Fleischer: Privacy...?, The Need for Global Pri-
vacy Standards, http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2007/09/need-for-global-privacy-stand 
ards.html (Sept. 14, 2007). 
337 Id. See also Posting of Peter Fleischer to Google Public Policy Blog, Call for global 
privacy standards, http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2007/09/call-for-global-privacy-
standards.html (Sept. 14, 2007, 11:03 PST); Michael Liedtke, Google wants global privacy 
standards, USA TODAY, Sept. 15, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetpriv 
acy/2007-09-14-google-global-privacy_N.htm. 
338 See supra Part V.C.3.b.
339 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO 
CONGRESS (July 27, 1999), http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/07/privacy99.pdf.
340 Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 106th Cong. (2000) (prepared 
2009] EU-U.S. DATA PRIVACY SAFE HARBOR 239
Bush appointed a new head FTC commissioner, the FTC’s policy reverted 
to privacy self-regulation.341 Today, the FTC polices online privacy in four 
areas: (1) U.S. consumer access to their own information; (2) U.S. consumer 
choice about use of their information; (3) U.S. consumer opportunity to 
correct errors in collected information; and (4) security of information from 
unauthorized use.342
The FTC’s earliest effort of applying the FTC Act to online privacy 
was a 1999 prosecution of GeoCities, a website hosting service.343 GeoCi-
ties offered free and fee-based web hosting services after consumers filled 
out an online form that included some questions that were mandatory and 
other questions that were optional.344 The form also asked if applicants 
wished to receive offers from advertisers.345 The FTC alleged that the 
GeoCities website misled customers to believe that advertisers would only 
receive the information consumers provided in the mandatory sections, in-
cluding name and address.346 Instead, GeoCities also shared the information 
that consumers provided in the optional form sections, including education 
level, income, marital status, occupation, and interests.347 The FTC settled 
with GeoCities in return for GeoCities’ agreement to post a privacy policy 
that informed consumers what information was being collected and for what 
purpose, to whom it will be disclosed, and how consumers can access and 
remove the information.348
The FTC has also successfully pursued several other corporations 
for online privacy violations. In 2000, the FTC prosecuted ReverseAuc-
tion.com for harvesting consumers’ personal information from a competi-
tor’s site and then sending deceptive spam to the consumers to solicit their 
business.349 In 2000, the FTC prosecuted Toysmart.com for selling confi-
statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the Fed. Trade Comm’n), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/testimonyprivacy.htm. See also FED. TRADE COMM’N, ONLINE 
PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS: PART 2 RECOMMENDATIONS (July 2000), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/onlineprofiling.htm. 
341 See TIMOTHY MURIS, PROTECTING CONSUMERS’ PRIVACY: 2002 AND BEYOND (Oct. 4, 
2001), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privisp1002.shtm.  
342 WARD, supra note 321, at 6–38. 
343 See Geocities, 127 F.T.C. 94 (1999) (consent order). 
344 Id. at 95–97. 
345 Id. at 97. 
346 Id. at 96–97. 
347 Id. at 97–98. 
348 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Internet Site Agrees to Settle FTC Charges of 
Deceptively Collecting Personal Information in Agency's First Internet Privacy Case (Aug. 
13, 1998), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/08/geocitie.shtm. 
349 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Online Auction Site Settles FTC Privacy 
Charges (Jan. 6, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/01/reverse4.shtm. See also FTC v. 
Reverseauction.com, FTC File No. 002-3046, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist
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dential, personal customer information collected on the Toysmart.com web-
site, despite Toysmart.com’s privacy policy to the contrary.350 In 2001, the 
FTC prosecuted Microsoft for falsely representing that its “Passport Wallet” 
service, which stored customer credit card numbers and billing information, 
was safer or more secure than purchases made at other websites without the 
“Passport Wallet” service.351 In 2002, the FTC prosecuted the pharmaceuti-
cal company Eli Lilly for unintentionally disclosing the entire recipient list 
of a Prozac refill-reminder service to every subscriber of the service.352 In 
2002, the FTC prosecuted Guess.com—a website that sells Guess jeans—
for failing to take reasonable measures to prevent consumer information, 
including credit card numbers, from being accessed by hackers.353 In 2004, 
the FTC prosecuted Tower Direct—the company that owns Tower Records 
and runs the Tower Records website—for a security flaw in the Tower 
Records website that exposed customers’ personal information to other cus-
tomers, in violation of Tower Direct’s privacy policy representations.354
Finally, in 2005, the FTC prosecuted Vision Properties—a company that 
provided virtual “shopping cart” services to thousands of online mer-
chants—for collecting and renting customer personal information sourced 
from the online merchants that employed Vision Properties.355 Neither the 
/reverseauction/index.shtm.
350 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Sues Failed Website, Toysmart.com, for 
Deceptively Offering for Sale Personal Information of Website Visitors (July 10, 2000), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart.shtm. 
351 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Microsoft Settles FTC Charges Alleging False 
Security and Privacy Promises (Aug. 8, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/08/microsoft.s 
htm. See also In the Matter of Microsoft Corporation, FTC File No. 012-3240, 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0123240/0123240.shtm. 
352 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Eli Lilly Settles FTC Charges Concerning 
Security Breach (Jan. 18, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/01/elililly.shtm. See also In 
the Matter of Eli Lilly and Company, FTC File No. 012-3214, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/ 
0123214/0123214.shtm.
353 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Guess Settles FTC Security Charges; Third 
FTC Case Targets False Claims about Information Security (June 18, 2003), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/06/guess.shtm. See also In the Matter of Guess?, Inc., and 
Guess.com, Inc., FTC File No. 022-3260, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0223260/index.sh 
tm. 
354 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Security Flaw Allegedly Exposed Customers’ 
Personal Information to Other Web Users (April 21, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/04/ 
towerrecords.shtm. See also In the Matter of MTS, Inc., doing business as Tower 
Records/Books/Video, a corporation, and Tower Direct, LLC, doing business as TowerRe-
cords.com, a corporation, FTC File No. 032-3209, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/032320 
9/0323209.shtm.
355 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Internet Service Provider Settles FTC Privacy 
Charges (Mar. 10, 2005), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/03/cartmanager.shtm. See also In the 
Matter of Vision Properties, LLC, doing business as CartManager International, FTC File 
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customers nor the online merchants that employed Vision Properties con-
sented to collecting and renting the customer information.356
Finally, the FTC has recently taken several proactive steps to ad-
dress online privacy. It has created an online tutorial to educate businesses 
and other organizations about practical and low-cost data security me-
thods.357 Additionally, it addressed the behavioral advertising issues raised 
by online advertising and the merger of Google and DoubleClick.358 In No-
vember 2007, the FTC held a conference on behavioral advertising.359 In 
response to input received at the conference, the FTC commissioner voted 
unanimously to approve the release of new behavioral advertising privacy 
principles.360 The FTC proposed that behavioral advertisers should: (1) 
clearly state that consumer data is being collected; (2) allow consumers to 
easily opt-out of data collection; (3) secure the customer data collected; (4) 
retain customer data only “as long as is necessary to fulfill a legitimate 
business or law enforcement need;” (5) obtain a customer’s “affirmative 
express consent” if a behavioral advertiser wishes to use a customer’s data 
for a “materially different purpose than was disclosed when the data was 
collected;” and (6) obtain a customer’s “affirmative express consent” before 
collecting “sensitive” consumer data—such as data on health and sexual 
orientation.361 The FTC’s proposed behavior advertising principles are ex-
tremely similar to the Safe Harbor’s general requirements on data collec-
tion.362 The FTC’s recent proactive approach to privacy regulation shows 
that it is prepared to undertake a larger role regulating privacy under a re-
vised Safe Harbor. 
356 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Internet Service Provider Settles FTC Privacy 
Charges (Mar. 10, 2005), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/03/cartmanager.shtm.
357 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business, 
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358 See supra Part IV (discussing the privacy implications of the Google-DoubleClick mer-
ger).
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Issues and Online Behavioral Advertising (Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/08
/ehavioral.shtm. See also Fed. Trade Comm’n, Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, 
and Technology, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/ehavioral/index.shtml. 
360 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Proposes Online Behavioral Advertising Privacy 
Principles (Dec. 20, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/12/principles.shtm.
361 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Online Behavioral Advertising: Moving the Discussion Forward to 
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stmt.pdf.
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242 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:193 
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the EU may have initially believed that the Safe Harbor 
Enforcement Principle’s “independent recourse mechanisms” could effec-
tively enforce the Safe Harbor, it remains highly questionable whether the 
current enforcement mechanisms are sufficient. The enforcement mechan-
isms in place appear ineffective and, therefore, are likely unable to deter 
violators. Ineffective enforcement, in turn, creates deteriorating trust and 
possibly reduced trade. The EU and the U.S. should renegotiate the Safe 
Harbor’s Enforcement Principle and replace its ineffective “independent 
recourse mechanisms” with FTC oversight. Broad FTC oversight would be 
an effective Safe Harbor enforcement mechanism that would reconcile the 
difference between EU and U.S. privacy laws. 
